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Rethinking Merger Efficiencies 
 
 
Daniel A. Crane* 
Merger law exhibits an unexplained and unexamined 
differentiation between probabilistic costs and benefits.1
 
*  Professor of Law, University of Michigan.  Earlier drafts of this paper were 
presented at workshops at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology/University of 
Zurich, the University of East Anglia, and the University of Michigan. This paper 
grew out of a joint submission to the Justice Department and Federal Trade 
Commission with Joe Simons.  All mistakes are, of course, my own. 
 In the two 
leading merger systems—those of United States and the European 
Union—merger law  implicitly requires a greater degree of predictive 
proof of merger-generated efficiencies than it does of merger-
generated social costs.  As a matter of both verbal formulation in the 
governing legal norms and observed practice of antitrust enforcement 
agencies and courts, the government is accorded greater evidentiary 
leniency in proving anticompetitive effects than the merging parties 
are in proving offsetting efficiencies. 
1  The voluminous academic literature on merger efficiencies includes Jamie 
Henikoff Moffitt, Merging in the Shadow of the Law:  The Case for Consistent 
Judicial Efficiency Analysis, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 1697 (2010); An Renckens, Welfare 
Standards, Substantive Tests, and Efficiency Considerations in Merger Policy:  
Defining the Efficiency Defense, 3 J. Comp. L & Econ. 149 (2007); Robert 
Pitofsky, Efficiency Consideration and Merger Enforcement:  Comparison of U.S. 
and EU Approaches, 30 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1413 (2007); Malcolm B. Coate, 
Efficiencies in Merger Analysis:  An Institutionalist View, 13 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 
189 (2005); William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and 
the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 
Antitrust L. J. 207 (2003); Robert Pitofsky, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 485 (1999); 
Timothy J. Muris, The Government and Merger Efficiencies:  Still Hostile After All 
These Years, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 729 (1999); Gregory J. Werden, An Economic 
Perspective on the Analysis of Merger Efficiencies, 11-SUM Antitrust 12 (1997); 
Mark N. Berry, Efficiencies and Horizontal Mergers:  In Search of a Defense, 33 
San Diego L. Rev. 515 (1996); Joseph Kattan, Efficiencies and Merger Analysis, 62 
Antitrust L. J. 513 (1994); Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency 
Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 1580 (1983); Jackson, The 
Consideration of Economies in Merger Cases, 43 J. Bus. 439 (1970). 
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To illustrate, suppose that the best available economic evidence 
holds that a horizontal merger is 40% likely to create $100 in net 
present value consumer welfare losses and 40% likely to create $100 
in net present value efficiencies that would be passed on to 
consumers.2
The systemic consequences of this asymmetry are significant, in a 
way that has not previously been appreciated.  Superficially, it might 
appear that the only consequence of a more stringent approach to 
claims of merger efficiencies is that some mergers that are close calls 
on the anticompetitive effects side of the ledger will be prohibited 
even though, on balance, they might actually benefit to society.  
Since merger policy has been relatively lenient overall in the past 
three decades, false positives in a handful of close-call merger cases 
might seem a relatively trivial consequence of an unexplained 
evidentiary asymmetry.  But this view incorrectly assumes that the 
only consequence of stringency on proof of efficiencies falls on the 
efficiencies side of the ledger.  There are good reasons to think that 
this is not true—that courts and agencies selectively compensate for 
not giving much weight to merger efficiencies claims by demanding 
too much proof of anticompetitive effects from government antitrust 
enforcers.  In an alternative legal regime where efficiencies and risks 
were equally weighted and parties therefore had a greater incentive to 
come forward with evidence of efficiencies, some mergers that today 
proceed unchallenged might very well be challenged since courts and 
enforcers might become more credulous of anticompetitive effects 
theories in cases without plausible efficiencies claims.  Rebalancing 
the weighting of efficiencies and anticompetitive effects might have a 
  Putting aside enforcement costs, the expected value of 
the merger to consumers is zero.  Therefore, all else being equal, 
there is no reason to challenge the merger, particularly given 
enforcement costs, which are high.  Under prevailing norms and 
practices, however, the merger would likely be challenged.  
Superficially, at least, the articulated legal mechanism for this 
differentiation would be a difference in the standards of proof for the 
government’s affirmative case and the defendant’s rebuttal case. 
 
2 The efficiencies and harms of mergers are almost always something to be 
predicted, because most jurisdictions that prohibit anticompetitive mergers, 
including the US and the EU, require premerger notification and clearance of most 
categories of potentially troubling mergers.  Hence, the merger review function 
occurs before actual harms or efficiencies are known.  See infra text accompanying 
notes xxx – xxx. 
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significant effect on the overall mix and distribution of merger 
challenges. 
This Article interrogates the differential treatment of costs and 
benefits and argues that it is unjustified and counterproductive.  A 
potential merger efficiency should be given equal weight to an 
equally likely anticompetitive risk of the same magnitude. To put it 
more formally, the probability-adjusted net present value of merger 
risks should be treated symmetrically with the probability-adjusted 
net present value of merger efficiencies.   
The proposition just advanced might seem intuitively obvious 
given ordinary cost-benefit analysis principles, but there are a 
number of reasons why symmetrical weighting might not hold in the 
merger context.  Merger efficiencies might be disfavored because 
they tend to be captured by producers rather than consumers, even 
while the consumers bear the full weight of anticompetitive effects.  
They might be disfavored because short-run efficiencies can create 
long-run market dominance that create further inefficiencies as the 
merging firms eventually exercise market power.  They might be 
disfavored because, unlike anticompetitive effects theories, 
efficiencies theories are inherently speculative.  Relatedly, 
efficiencies claims may be suspect because of a general view that 
large corporate mergers are more often the product of kingdom-
building by imperialistic CEOs than efforts to generate shareholder 
value or that managers proposing mergers suffer, as a class, from 
optimism bias. 
Merger efficiencies may also be running up against the 
expression of political or ideological values in merger policy.  
Efficiency doctrine and practice may express residual manifestations 
of the precautionary principle, which holds that the proponents of 
economic changes that may pose risks to social welfare bear a high 
burden of ruling out the risks before the change should be allowed. 
Or, the veiled antipathy to merger efficiencies may be a holding place 
for ideological resistance to large aggregations of economic power, 
even when those aggregations advance short-run consumer interests. 
This Article interrogates and normatively rejects each of these 
possible justifications for cost/benefit asymmetry.  It argues in favor 
of a formal principle of symmetrical treatment of expected costs and 
benefits from future mergers.  However, treating costs and benefits 
symmetrically does not necessarily entail a comprehensive overhaul 
in the way that merger efficiencies are considered or the weight they 
are given in merger review.  Courts and agencies sometimes discount 
3
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certain efficiency claims for justifiable reasons.  Some efficiency 
claims are inherently speculative or unlikely to advance consumer 
welfare.  Rather, adoption of the symmetry principle would add rigor 
and transparency to merger review and reveal circumstances where 
well-founded efficiency defenses may be subordinated to confused 
analysis or weakly articulated policy objections. 
Part I of this Article sets the stage by describing the prospective 
context of merger review decisions, which require agencies and 
sometimes courts to make predictive assessments of the 
consequences of mergers that have not yet occurred.  It then 
describes the asymmetrical treatment between merger costs and 
benefits as a positive matter in the law and practice of U.S. and 
European antitrust agencies and courts.  Although these two leading 
and often competing merger control jurisdictions differ in many ways 
on the substance and institutional framework of merger review, they 
share a common and unexplained devaluation of merger efficiencies 
as compared to their treatment of predicted anticompetitive merger 
costs. 
Part II analyzes the systemic consequences of the understood 
norm of agency and court discounting of merger efficiency 
arguments.  While this phenomenon has generally been understood 
just to stand in the way of some mergers potentially beneficial to 
society, the asymmetry principle may in fact result in an overall 
suboptimal mix of approved and disapproved mergers, since the 
principle tends to create a suboptimal amount of information that 
would be useful in judging both predictive efficiencies and 
anticompetitive effects. 
Part III identifies a number of possible justifications for 
asymmetrical treatment and rejects each one as normatively 
insufficient to justify a principle of asymmetry.   
Finally, Part IV proposes a path forward for more fluid 
integration of efficiency concerns in merger review.  It considers the 
role that burdens of proof should play on efficiencies questions.  It 
also acknowledges that a principle of symmetrical treatment cannot 
be applied in a numerically rigid way but rather serves as mnemonic 
device to stimulate a rebalancing in some key drivers of merger 
policy.  Finally, it considers the additional complexity costs that a 
symmetry principle might entail. 
4
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I. MERGER EFFICIENCIES’ LEGAL MALAISE 
A.  The Predictive Context of Merger Decisions 
 
Unlike adjudicatory decision-making, which usually involves 
reconstructing past facts and sorting through their legal implications, 
regulatory decision-making inherently involves predictions about the 
future.3  When the FDA decides whether to allow the marketing of a 
new drug, the EPA decides whether to allow a new pesticide, or the 
Highway Transportation Safety Board decides on rules for new 
automobile safety features, the agencies must make predictions about 
the respective costs and benefits of the innovations.4  Still, even in 
these regulatory contexts where future paths and not past conduct is 
in question, the agencies usually can base their decisions on a 
sampling of information reflecting the innovation’s properties.  The 
FDA can review clinical trials,5 the EPA can order testing of the 
pesticides,6 and the Highway Transportation Safety Board can 
simulate the robustness of the safety devices in crash tests.7
By contrast, most modern merger review requires predictions 
about the likely consequences of an event that has not yet occurred 
and which it is not possible to sample, study, or test.  With few 
exceptions, merger challenges occur before mergers have closed.  In 
the United States, this is due to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976, 
which requires parties making stock or asset acquisitions that meet 
certain dollar thresholds to file a premerger notification document 
  The 
predictions are thus extrapolations from controlled experiments to 
real world interactions. 
 
3 See generally Michael Abramowicz, Predictive Decsionmaking, 92 Va. L. Rev. 
69 (2006). 
4 See generally Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality:  
How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and our Health 
(2008). 
5 U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Running Clinical Trials, 
http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RunningClinicalTrials/default.
htm (explaining regulatory framework for running clinical trials). 
6 See generally 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2006) (codifying EPA’s regulatory authority over 
pesticides). 
7 Updated Review of Potential Test Procedures for FMVSS  No. 208, 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/NRD/Multimedia/PDFs/Crashworthiness/Air
%20Bags/FMVSS_208_II.pdf. 
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with both the U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies.8  The parties may 
not close the merger transaction until thirty days after filing the 
premerger notification.9  If prior to the close of the thirty days 
whichever agency is handling the case has concerns about the 
transaction, it can file a dreaded “second request” for information.10  
The parties are then prohibited to close the merger until certifying 
substantial completion of the second request,11 a process which can 
take upwards of six months.12  Because most mergers are time 
sensitive, parties have strong incentives to seek resolution with the 
agencies by restructuring their deals to assuage any competitive 
concerns or else to abandon the deals rather than to litigate.13
The European Union follows an even stricter premerger clearance 
system.  Subject to various exceptions, parties to a merger must file a 
premerger notification form and await a final decision by the 
European Commission before closing the transaction.
 
14  The review 
can take up to 105 days.15  If the Commission chooses to prohibit a 
merger, the parties must then seek annulment of the Commission 
decision in the European General Court, a process than take over a 
year even on a “fast track.”16
 
8 15 U.S.C. § 18a. 
  As in the U.S., most firms abandon or 
9 Id. 
10  Id. 
11 Id. 
12 See Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1375, 1462 n.382 (2009) (collecting various estimates on time 
and expense to comply with second request). 
13 Joe Sims & Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-Scott-
Rodino on Merger Practice: A Case Study in the Law of Unintended Consequences 
Applied to Antitrust Legislation, 65 Antitrust L.J. 865, 881 (1997) (noting that the 
FTC and DOJ have “essentially create[d] the automatic stay of a transaction that 
the 94th Congress explicitly refused to grant”); see also Edward T. Swaine, 
“Competition, Not Competitors,” Nor Canards: Ways of Criticizing the 
Commission, 23 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 597, 632 (2002) (arguing that “American 
companies might be slow to characterize the HSR process as one susceptible to 
judicial oversight” because “[v]oluminous Second Requests” act as “de facto 
injunctions”). 
14 ELEANOR M. FOX & DANIEL A. CRANE, GLOBAL ISSUES IN ANTITRUST AND 
COMPETITION LAW 451 (2010). 
15 EU Competition Law:  Rules Applicable to Merger Control (1 April 2010), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/merger_compilation.pdf. 
16 John Davies & Robert Schlossberg, Once More Unto the Breach Dear Friends”: 
Judicial Review of Antitrust Agency Merger Clearance Decisions, 21 Antitrust 17, 
21-22 (2006) (describing the European “fast-track” judicial review procedure 
6
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restructure deals that the Commission challenges rather than 
choosing to litigate.17
Further, antitrust principles prohibit “gun jumping,” that is to say 
any pre-closing integration or coordination of the firms on such 
matters as price and output.
  
18  The upshot is that, in the horizontal 
cases which are by far the largest set of merger cases,19
In evaluating likely anticompetitive effects, the agencies 
generally consider one of two kinds of theories.  In homogenous 
goods markets, they consider the possibility that the merger will 
increase concentration to the point that tacit or explicit collusion 
(such as price fixing or market division) among the remaining firms 
in the market will be facilitated.
 the firms 
must continue to behave as arms-length competitors during the time 
period during which the potential anticompetitive effects of their 
proposed merger are under evaluation.  Thus, on neither the 
predictive anticompetitive effects side nor on the predictive 
efficiencies side do the agencies have sample data from which they 
can extrapolate results before they must make their decision. 
20
 
which can take seven to nineteen months as compared to an average of thirty-one 
months in for cases not on a fast track); Stephanie Bodoni, EU Judge Vesterdorf 
Backs New Antitrust Court to Speed Up Cases, Bloomberg.com, Oct. 24, 2006, 
http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=afPmsLOj93rQ&refer=euro
pe (noting that judicial review of Commission decisions in merger cases takes on 
average nine and eleven months). 
  These “coordinated interaction” 
theories tend to depend heavily on structural assumptions—for 
example, that concentration levels above a certain Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index (“HHI”) in markets characterized by certain 
features (for example, high fungibility of goods, transparency of 
17 The European Commission rarely reaches a prohibition decision in merger cases 
since most questionable mergers are resolved by the merging parties making 
“commitments” that resolve any competitive concerns.  The Commission’s 
statistics show that the Commission only reached 21 prohibition decisions over the 
20-year period from 1990 to 2010.  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf.  In the same period, it 
allowed 93 mergers with “commitments.” 
18 See Kathryn M. Fenton & Erin M. Fishman, M&A Transaction Planning:  
Premerger Coordination, Gun Jumping, and Other Related Issues, 1565 PLI/Corp 
245 (2006). 
19 HMG § 7; see generally Andrew R. Dick,  Coordinated Interaction:  Pre-Merger 
Constraints and Post-Merger Effects, 12 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 65 (2003). 
20 HMG § 7. 
7
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pricing, entry barriers, strong mechanisms for detecting price cutting, 
and a history of past collusion) tend to result in increased 
opportunities to collude.21
In differentiated goods markets, collusion is far less likely to 
result even with increases in concentration and the agencies tend to 
focus on the possibility that the merger will allow the merging parties 
to increase price or reduce quality even without tacit or explicit 
collusion.
 
22  In these cases, the agencies apply a “unilateral effects” 
theory to determine whether the merged firms would be able to 
increase prices or decrease quality even without cooperation by the 
other firms in the market.23  The key factor in such an analysis is 
whether consumers consider the products sold by the merging parties 
to be each other’s best substitutes—meaning that customers tend to 
substitute preferentially between the goods or services of the merging 
parties.24  Critical to these types of analyses are the diversion ratios 
between the two firms’ products.25  The agencies also pay close 
attention to the possibility of price discrimination against vulnerable 
populations of customers which a merger may facilitate even if it 
does not permit price increases to the market as a whole.26
The sources of information that the agencies consider in 
deploying coordinated interaction and unilateral effects models vary 
by the type of case.  Increasingly, the agencies place priority on 
experience with similar cases.
 
27  Where the necessary market share 
and demand elasticity data are available, economists in the agencies 
run merger simulations to estimate the price effects resulting from the 
merger.28
 
21 Id. 
 
22 HMG § 6.  See generally David Scheffman & Joseph Simons, Unilateral Effects 
for Differentiated Products:  Theory, Assumptions, and Research, 9-APR Antitrust 
Source 1 (2010). 
23 HMG § 6.1. 
24 Id. 
25 Id.  A diversion ratio is “the fraction of unit sales lost by the first product due to 
an increase in its price that would be diverted to the second product.”  Id. 
26 HMG § 3. 
27 HMG § 2.1.2. 
28 See Kai Hüschelrath, Detection of Anticompetitive Horizontal Mergers, 5 J. 
Comp. L. & Econ. 683, 694 (2009); Roy Epstein & Daniel Rubinfeld, Merger 
Simulation: A Simplified Approach with New Applications, 6 Antitrust L.J. 883 
(2001); Philip Crooke, Luke Froeb, Steven Tschantz & Gregory Werden, Effects of 
Assumed Demand Form on Simulated Postmerger Equilibria, 15 Rev. Indus. Org. 
205 (1999).  
8
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Only about five percent of all mergers scrutinized by the antitrust 
agencies in the U.S. and the EU give rise to competitive concerns.29  
Weighing against these concerns of anticompetitive effects are 
potential economies from the merger.  Generically, merger 
efficiencies can include economies of scale or scope, technological 
complementarity, reduction in transportation or other distribution 
costs, reduced capital costs, product line specialization, deployment 
of scarce managerial talent across a wider portfolio of assets, and 
positive innovation effects due to the combination of research and 
development laboratories or intellectual property portfolios.30
The upshot is that merger control is an inherently predictive 
exercise.  While the quality of available models and data concerning 
proposed mergers varies by issue, merger law is inherently about 
diving future industrial paths in light of the exogenous shock of firm 
integration.  It is for this reason that probability principles play such 
an important role in steering the contours of merger review. 
  To a 
large extent, predictions about these efficiencies depends less on 
models and more on fact-specific data than is true on the 
anticompetitive effects side of the ledger. 
 
B.  U.S. Legal Principles 
 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as modified by the 1950 Celler-
Kefauver Amendments, forms the substantive bedrock of U.S. 
merger policy.  Its terse text, prohibiting mergers and asset 
acquisitions whose effect “may be substantially to lessen 
competition”31
In explicating the text of Section 7, the Supreme Court has read 
the word “may” as providing some indication of the threshold of 
proof necessary for a finding that a merger is predictively 
anticompetitive.  In oft-repeated dictum from its 1962 Brown Shoe 
opinion, the Court observed:  “Congress used the words ‘may be 
substantially to lessen competition’ (emphasis supplied, to indicate 
 makes no reference either to a threshold of probability 
for a finding of anticompetitive effects nor to any possibility of an 
efficiencies defense.   
 
29 Pitofsky, Efficiency Consideration, supra n. xxx at 1413. 
30 PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE 
RESTRUCTURINGS 117-68 (2d ed. 2007) (outlining motivations for mergers and 
acquisitions); Fisher & Lande, supra n. xxx at 1599. 
31 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
9
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that its concern was with probabilities, not certainties.”32   Reflecting 
on Celler-Kefauver’s legislative history, the Court observed that 
“[s]tatutes existed for dealing with clear-cut menaces to competition; 
no statute was sought for dealing with ephemeral possibilities,”33 
thus suggesting that the threshold of necessary probability lies 
somewhere between the “clear-cut” and the “ephemeral.”  Summing 
up the threshold of probability question, the Court observed:  
“Mergers with a probable anticompetitive effect were to be 
proscribed by this Act.”34
The elliptical use of “probable” evokes a commonly used, if not 
precisely defined, threshold in the hierarchy of American legal 
probability—probable cause, which is the quantum of probability 
necessary for the issuance of a search warrant under the Fourth 
Amendment.  The Supreme Court has denied that probable cause is 
susceptible of “precise definition or quantification into 
percentages,”
  
35 but practitioners and commentators often understand 
it to lie in the 40-45% range.36  A survey of federal judges found an 
average percentage of 46% for probable cause.37
Complicating this assessment is the fact that most litigated 
merger proceedings (of which there are very few since most merger 
cases are resolved within the agencies)
  In any event, the 
Supreme Court’s repeated invocation of “probability” as the relevant 
threshold of proof for merger harms suggests that the Government’s 
burden in seeking to enjoin a merger is less than a preponderance of 
the evidence. 
38 are decided on preliminary 
injunctions rather than trials on the merits.39
 
32 Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962). 
  In typical preliminary 
injunction proceedings, the plaintiff needs to establish a “substantial 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). 
36 See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, The Crime Drop and the Fourth Amendment:  
Toward and Empirical Jurisprudence of Search and Seizure, 29 NYU Rev. L. & 
Soc. Change, 641, 680 (2005) (reporting that a newly minted Assistant United 
States Attorney was informed by his supervisor that probable cause meant 40%). 
37 C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or 
Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1293, 1325 (1982). 
38 See infra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx. 
39 See Moffitt, supra n. xxx at 1710 (analyzing preliminary injunction decisions 
from past twenty-five years). 
10
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likelihood of success on the merits,” a threshold higher than probable 
cause and probably higher than a preponderance of the evidence.40  
But since the ultimate standard of proof is probability, not 
preponderance, the government’s effective burden is merely to prove 
a “substantial likelihood” that it will eventually be able to show 
probable cause to block the merger—a combination that seems to 
make the Government’s burden shrink arithmetically.  Further, when 
the Federal Trade Commission sues for a preliminary injunction to 
block a merger so that it may conduct a full administrative review of 
the merger, courts have held that the FTC need only raise “serious, 
substantial, difficult, and doubtful” issues about the merger.41
This bias in favor of harms over efficiencies is reflected in the 
text of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (which were substantially 
overhauled in 2010).  The Guidelines implicitly treat the efficiencies 
and the anticompetitive risks asymmetrically by insisting that 
efficiencies be proven to a very high degree of certainty in order to 
justify a merger whereas risks need not be proven with great certainty 
in order to block a merger.
 This 
seems to collapse the necessary threshold of probability on 
anticompetitive effects even further. 
42  In order to find anticompetitive effects, 
the Guidelines require only “reliable” evidence about the “likely 
effects of a merger.”43
 
40 See, e.g., U.S. v. Melrose East Subdivision, 357 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(observing that a substantial likelihood of success on the merits is presumably a 
higher standard than probable cause). 
  On the other hand, the guidelines project an 
attitude of suspicion at the least, and hostility at the most, toward 
efficiencies claims.  They note that “[e]ficiencies are difficult to 
verify and quantify, in part because much of the information relating 
to efficiencies is uniquely in the possession of the merging firms. 
41 FTC v. Whole Foods, Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
42 The same held under the recently-replaced 1992 Guidelines.  Thus, for example, 
Section 1 of the 1992 Guidelines explained that the overall analysis is focused on 
whether firms “likely would” take certain actions given their economic interests.  
There was no requirement of a verification that the firms actually would raise 
prices post merger, just that doing so would be consistent with a rational actor 
model.  On the other hand, Section 4 sternly warned that efficiencies defenses are 
not to made lightly.  Efficiencies can’t just be predicted; they must be verified 
through empirical evidence.  When potential adverse competitive effects are 
expected to be “large,” verified efficiencies must be “extraordinarily great.” 
43 HMG § 2.2.1. 
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Moreover, efficiencies projected reasonably and in good faith by the 
merging firms may not be realized. Therefore, it is incumbent upon 
the merging firms to substantiate efficiency claims so that the 
Agencies can verify by reasonable means the likelihood and 
magnitude of each asserted efficiency, how and when each would be 
achieved (and any costs of doing so), how each would enhance the 
merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, and why each would 
be merger-specific.”44  They then go on to warn that “[e]fficiency 
claims will not be considered if they are vague, speculative, or 
otherwise cannot be verified by reasonable means,” that  
“[p]rojections of efficiencies may be viewed with skepticism, 
particularly when generated outside of the usual business planning 
process.”45
 
  The Guidelines then explicitly state that the agencies will 
not give equal weight to efficiencies and harms: 
In conducting this analysis, the Agencies will not simply 
compare the magnitude of the cognizable efficiencies with the 
magnitude of the likely harm to competition absent the 
efficiencies. The greater the potential adverse competitive 
effect of a merger, the greater must be the cognizable 
efficiencies, and the more they must be passed through to 
customers, for the Agencies to conclude that the merger will 
not have an anticompetitive effect in the relevant market. When 
the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger is likely to 
be particularly substantial, extraordinarily great cognizable 
efficiencies would be necessary to prevent the merger from 
being anticompetitive. In adhering to this approach, the 
Agencies are mindful that the antitrust laws give competition, 
not internal operational efficiency, primacy in protecting 
customers.46
 
 
The asymmetrical treatment between expected harms and 
efficiencies is not merely a function of parsing the Guidelines’ text.  
Despite some greater sympathy toward efficiencies in recent years, 
 
44 Id. § 10. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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practitioners report that the agencies usually react with coolness to 
efficiencies arguments.47
 
 
C.  EU Legal Principles 
 
EU merger law derives from the EC Merger Regulation.48  Unlike 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, paragraph 29 of the Merger Regulation 
specifically recognizes efficiency defenses.49  Nonetheless, the scope 
of the efficiencies defense and its correspondence with the threshold 
of proof necessary to show predicted anticompetitive effects remain 
subject to some doubt.50
Under EU case law, the Commission is accorded “a margin of 
discretion” in making its predictions about anticompetitive effects 
from mergers. 
 
51 The courts defer to Commission decisions so long 
as the “evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and 
consistent” and the record “contains all the information which must 
be taken into account in order to assess a complex situation and 
whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from 
it.”52  On the other hand, the merging parties bear the burden of 
proving that efficiencies are “likely to materialize” and generally 
must use “precise and convincing” evidence to do so.53
The EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines place on the merging 
parties the burden of proving efficiencies and require that the 
 
 
47 See Muris, supra n. xxx at 751 (“Hostility reflects the long standing reluctance to 
accept fully the cost-reducing potential of mergers”); see also text accompanying 
notes xxx – xxx (FTC study). 
48 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the Control of 
Concentrations between Undertakings. 
49 Council Regulation ¶ 29 (“In order to determine the impact of a concentration on 
competition in the common market, it is appropriate to take account of any 
substantiated and likely efficiencies put forward by the undertakings concerned. It 
is possible that the efficiencies brought about by the concentration counteract the 
effects on competition, and in particular the potential harm to consumers, that it 
might otherwise have and that, as a consequence, the concentration would not 
significantly impede effective competition, in the common market or in a 
substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position.”). 
50 See Fabienne Ilzkovitz & Roderick Meiklejohn, European Merger Control:  Do 
We Need an Efficiency Defense, 3 J. Indus., Comp, & Trade 57 (2003). 
51 Rynair Holdings, Case T-342/07 (General Court  6 July 2010). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
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efficiencies claims “be verifiable such that the Commission can be 
reasonably certain that the efficiencies are likely to materialize.”54  
The Non-Horizontal Guidelines seem to strike a softer tone on 
efficiencies, suggesting that in the vertical and conglomerate context, 
expected efficiencies and anticompetitive effects need to be 
weighed.55  However they later repeat that proving efficiencies is the 
parties’ burden and that the same criteria of verifiability as apply 
under the Horizontal Guidelines apply to vertical and conglomerate 
mergers.56  Read as a whole, the Non-Horizontal Guidelines “appear 
to suggest that the pro-competitive effects of a merger should be 
subject to more exacting evidentiary standards than theories of 
competitive harm.”57
As in the United States, European practitioners report that 
efficiencies defenses are difficult to sustain, at least in horizontal 
merger cases.  In vertical merger cases, consistently with the softer 
approach in the guidelines, efficiencies defenses have sometimes 
been accepted.  For example, in TomTom/TeleAtlas, the Commission 
found that the vertical integration between a map supplier and a 
maker of navigations systems would likely reduce prices to 
consumers by a small amount since the vertically integrated firm 
would eliminate double marginalization.
 
58
 
54 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council 
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, ¶ 86 (2004/C 
31/03). 
  However, as in many 
other cases, the efficiencies argument appears to have merely been 
the icing on the key finding—that the merged firms would not have 
an incentive to behave anticompetitively.  It is unclear whether 
efficiencies concerns are doing substantial, independent work in 
55 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council 
Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings, ¶ 21 (2008/C 
265/07). 
56 Id. ¶ 52. 
57 Linklaters and Charles River Associates International, The European 
Commission’s Draft Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers, 
Comment, at 4, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/files_non_horizontal_consultati
on/linklaters.pdf.  The Linklaters and CRA comment addressed the draft 
guidelines, but the Commission made no modification to the text that would negate 
the comment. 
58 See Penelope Papandropoulos, Non-Horizontal Mergers:  Recent EC Cases, 
(May 29, 2009), 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/non_horizontal_mergers.pdf. 
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European merger policy.  At a minimum, EU law and practice, like 
U.S. law and practice, treats probability adjusted risks and benefits 
asymmetrically in merger review. 
II. SYSTEMIC EFFECTS OF FORMAL ASYMMETRY 
The formal position of the antitrust enforcement agencies and 
courts in the U.S. and the EU is that merger efficiencies count only 
weakly, if at all, toward sustaining the legality of questionable 
mergers.  The most obvious implication of this coolness toward 
efficiency claims is that some mergers that would be cleared in a 
more efficiency hospitable jurisdiction would not be cleared in the 
U.S. and the EU.  Under this assumption, a change in norms or 
practices resulting in a more hospitable reception for efficiencies 
should result in a net increase in the number of cleared mergers—in a 
liberalization of merger policy. 
But that conclusion may be unjustified.  Solicitude for 
efficiencies may already play a role in merger policy, but simply not 
at the level of individual case analysis.  Part of the movement toward 
liberalization of merger policy in the last two or three decades may 
already reflect a commitment to allowing efficient mergers without 
undertaking an individualized look at efficiencies claims.  A more 
particularized inquiry into merger efficiencies might not result in a 
further net liberalization of merger policy but only in a redistribution 
of the portfolios of permitted and prohibited mergers. 
To set the stage for an answer to these questions, this section first 
surveys the incidence and intensity of efficiencies discourse in 
merger negotiations between the merging parties and the government 
agencies.  It then provides a snapshot of the overall liberalization of 
merger policy in the U.S. and EU in the past several decades.  
Finally, it considers the systemic effects on the landscape of merger 
control that might follow from a rebalancing of merger costs and 
benefits. 
 
A.  Incidence, Intensity, and Effect of Efficiencies Discourse in 
Administrative Negotiations 
 
Much of the academic writing on merger efficiencies assumes a 
decisional model in which the antitrust agencies might exercise 
prosecutorial discretion not to challenge questionable mergers 
because of efficiencies but courts would usually serve as the ultimate 
15
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arbiters of mergers’ legality.59  Hence, much of the scholarly work on 
merger efficiencies has focused on judicial attitudes toward 
efficiencies.60
The available empirical work suggests that judges do purport to 
take efficiencies into account, but that efficiencies actually play little 
role in merger cases.  In a recent empirical study of 23 U.S. merger 
cases litigated between 1986 and 2009, Jamie Moffitt finds that 
“although courts claim to be balancing merger-generated efficiencies 
with other negative factors affecting market competition,” they are 
actually “making an assessment of the relevant concentration in the 
applicable market and then allowing that initial assessment to color 
their recognition of claimed efficiencies.”
   
61  Courts may thus be 
“stampeding” the efficiency factor based on their conclusion on 
market concentration and possible anticompetitive effects.62
But courts are no longer significant players in the formulation of 
U.S. merger policy.  As noted in the previous section, the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act has pushed most merger control decisions into the 
agencies and away from the courts.
   
63  For example, in 1983 when 
Fisher and Lande computed the “Type 3” costs of the greater 
complexities that an efficiencies defense would entail, they estimated 
twenty to twenty-five litigated merger cases a year.64  Their estimates 
were based on averages from the last decade showing nine FTC 
cases, seven Justice Department cases, and five private cases 
annually.65  Since the early 1980s, however, merger enforcement has 
moved increasingly in the direction of informal administration 
without litigation.66
 
59 See, e.g., Kolasky, supra n. xxx at 82 (discussing role of efficiencies in judicial 
decisions regarding mergers); Fisher & Lande, supra n. xxx; Moffitt, supra n. xxx. 
  Over the period 1990 to 2009, the FTC and 
Justice Department only litigated approximately 39 cases in court, 
60 Id. 
61 Moffitt, supra n. xxx at 1698. 
62 Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark 
Infringement, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1581, 1581-82 (2006) (describing tendency of 
courts in trademark cases to “stampede” in multi-factor analysis by using decision 
on a small number of critical factors to determine remaining factors). 
63 See supra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx. 
64 Fisher & Lande, supra n. xxx at 1675, 1675 n. 312. 
65 Id. n. 312. 
66 See generally, Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 51-
57 (2008). 
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fewer than a net of two per year for both agencies.67  For the last 
decade, 2000-2009, the total number of litigated merger cases was 
only 15.68  Private antitrust challenges to mergers are even rarer.69
The same is true in the EU.  Litigation over merger cases has 
become extremely infrequent.  The European Commission has only 
prohibited two mergers since 2002,
 
70
The upshot is that most discussions over merger efficiencies take 
place informally in non-public dialogue between the merger parties 
(or really, their lawyers and hired economists) and the lawyers and 
economists in the antitrust enforcement agencies.  To the extent that 
bargaining between the parties and the government occurs, it occurs 
“in the shadow of the law,”
 which means that most merger 
decisions have been made through internal administrative processes.  
Since a brief spurt of activity in 2002, the European courts have had 
little work to do on merger policy. 
71 in the sense that it is influenced by the 
parties’ expectations about judicial outcomes should they litigate.  In 
most cases, however, the law’s shadow is comparatively light, since 
most merging parties are unwilling to litigate in court should the 
agency decide to oppose the merger.72
 
67 This estimate is drawn from a study of data complied in the FTC and Justice’s 
Hart Scott Rodino Annual Report, which are available on the FTC’s website.  
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/anncompreports.shtm.  The estimate of 39 is based on the 
reported number of cases in which the agencies filed a complaint in federal court 
and the court took some action.  In a much larger number of cases, the agencies 
filed for a preliminary or permanent injunction and either the parties 
contemporaneously filed for a consent decree or the merging parties abandoned the 
transaction without a judicial decision. 
  The agencies’ merger 
guidelines set the stage for the administrative bargains, although the 
68 Id. 
69 Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate:  Antitrust in the Twenty-
First Century, 38 Loy. U. Chi. L. Rev. 513, 584 (2007) (noting that “[p]rivate 
parties rarely challenge mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act”). 
70 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf. 
71 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: 
The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 978 (1979). 
72 Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement 
Guidelines in a Global Economy, 81 Geo. L. J. 195, 225 (1992); Crane, Antitrust 
Antifederalism, supra n. xxx at xxx. 
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guidelines are not legally binding73 and their predictive power on 
agency attitudes is not always strong.74
Despite the prohibitive odds that efficiencies will make a 
difference in close-call cases, merging parties usually go through the 
ropes and make efficiency arguments.  A survey of 20 leading 
antitrust practitioners conducted by Jon Baker and Carl Shapiro in 
2007 revealed that the antitrust agencies had become significantly 
more receptive to efficiencies claims than they were a decade 
before.
 
75  Still, the data suggest that efficiencies arguments are 
seldom dispositive in close-call merger cases.  A recent study of 186 
merger cases at the FTC found that internal staff memoranda reported 
efficiencies claims in 147 out of 186 cases.76  In the cases in which 
the FTC staff reported the claimed dollar value of the claimed 
efficiencies, the mean figures ranged from $191 million to $237 
million depending on the time period.77  The claimed efficiencies 
represented an average of 8.1 percent of the transaction’s reported 
value.78  Efficiencies claims did not meet with particularly great 
success, at least in the Bureau of Competition (which is generally 
manned by lawyers).  The Bureau of Competition discussed 342 
efficiency claims (multiple efficiencies could be claimed in a single 
transaction), rejecting 109, accepting 29, and offering no conclusion 
on 204.79  Efficiencies claims fared considerably better at the Bureau 
of Economics (which is generally manned by economists), which 
considered 311 efficiencies claims, accepting 84, rejecting 37, and 
making no decision as to 190.80
 
73 FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 716 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (observing that 
“the Merger Guidelines are not binding on the court”). 
 
74 See Christine A. Varney, An Update on the Review of the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/254577.htm (“A consistent 
theme running through the panels is that there are indeed gaps between the 
Guidelines and actual agency practice--gaps in the sense of both omissions of 
important factors that help predict the competitive effects of mergers and 
statements that are either misleading or inaccurate.”}. 
75 Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger 
Enforcement, http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/mergerpolicy.pdf, at 29-30. 
76 Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew J. Heimert, Merger Efficiencies at the Federal 
Trade Commission, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/0902mergerefficiencies.pdf., at 
6. 
77 Id. at 12. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 16. 
80 Id. at 22. 
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Two factors are notable in these data.  The first is the significant 
difference in perspective between the lawyer and economist classes 
in the agencies—an issue to which we will return in Part III.  The 
second is the relative unimportance of efficiencies in merger analysis.  
The practice in the antitrust agencies seems to be liberal invocation 
of efficiencies arguments by the parties without a serious expectation 
of moving the agencies in most cases.  To the extent that the agencies 
ultimately cite efficiencies considerations in clearing mergers,  
antitrust practitioners report that they are often treated as “icing on 
the cake” in cases where there are no serious anticompetitive effects 
concerns.  As former FTC Chairman Tim Muris has observed, “[t]oo 
often, the Agencies found no cognizable efficiencies when 
anticompetitive effects were determined to be likely and seemed to 
recognize efficiency only when no adverse effects were predicted.”81
 
  
As in the courts, efficiencies discourse appears frequently in merger 
administration, but its influence on overall merger policy seems to be 
weak. 
B.  The Liberalization of Merger Policy 
 
Thus far, we have been considering the efficacy of efficiencies 
arguments as independent factors in merger policy as though  
efficiencies and anticompetitive effects were the credits and debits in 
a tidy system of double-entry bookkeeping that only interacted when 
tallied at the bottom of the page.  But, in fact, perspectives on 
efficiencies can enter merger policy at a variety of different points.  
A Bayesian prior belief that many mergers produce desirable 
efficiencies may push judges, legislators, or antitrust enforcers to 
take a solicitous view of mergers as a general proposition, even if 
they fail to credit case-specific efficiency arguments much of the 
time.   
Indeed, one prevailing normative view is precisely this—that 
legal systems should take into account merger efficiencies by 
articulating relatively lenient merger standards across the board 
rather than trying to explore efficiencies arguments on a case-by-case 
basis.  In perhaps the most influential article to make this point, 
Fisher and Lande argued against allowance of a merger efficiency 
defense on a case-by-case basis on the grounds that efficiencies, 
 
81 Timothy Muris, The Government and Merger Efficiencies: Still Hostile After All 
These Years, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 729, 731 (1999). 
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although often present in mergers, are hard to detect on a case-
specific basis.82  They also observed that allowing an efficiencies 
defense would increase both type 1 and type 2 error costs and what 
they styled type 3 error costs—the increased costs to businesses, 
enforcers, and decision makers from the increased complexity and 
unpredictability of an efficiencies defense.83 Instead of allowing an 
efficiencies defense on a case-by-case basis, Fisher and Lande would 
“raise[] the market-share thresholds of presumptive illegality to 
account for potential efficiencies gains,” thus recognizing an 
efficiency defense by liberalizing merger policy overall.84
It may be the case that Fisher and Lande’s recommendation has 
been de facto accepted in the last two decades.  It is certainly the case 
that the U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies have revised upward 
their presumptions on the thresholds of market concentration 
necessary for horizontal mergers to raise competitive concerns.  
Under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in place from 1992 to 2010, 
markets were considered unconcentrated if the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
(“HHI”) index
 
85 was below 1000, moderately concentrated if 
between 1000 and 1800, and concentrated if above 1800.86  Under 
the 2010 Guidelines, markets are unconcentrated if the HHI is below 
1500, moderately concentrated if between 1500 and 2500, and 
concentrated over 2500.87  The agencies have also raised the 
thresholds for the increase in concentration resulting from a merger 
to raise competitive concerns.88
One should be careful about reaching the conclusion that the 
antitrust agencies have become generally more permissive with 
respect to mergers based merely on this HHI inflation. Concentration 
ratios have become less significant in merger analysis in the past two 
 
 
82 Fisher & Lande, supra n. xxx at 1651-68. 
83 Id. at 1670. 
84 Id. at 1669. 
85 The HHI index is computed by squaring the sums of the market shares of the 
market participants. 
86 http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.shtm. 
87 http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html#5c. 
88 Under the 1992 Guidelines, an increase over 100 in a highly concentrated market 
created a presumption that the merger would create market power or facilitate its 
exercise.  Under the 2010 Guidelines over 200 in highly concentrated markets 
result in a presumption that the merger will create market power or facilitate its 
exercise. 
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decades.89  In large part, this reflects an overall shift in merger 
policing from homogenous goods markets—where markets are 
relatively easier to define, market shares easier to computer, and 
hence market concentration changes easier to calculate—to 
differentiated goods or services markets where markets are difficult 
to define robustly, shares are difficult to calculate robustly, and hence 
concentration indices are often close to meaningless.90  This shift in 
focus toward differentiated goods markets and unilateral effects 
theories has been driven in large part by fundamental changes in the 
economy itself.  As the economy has continued its evolution away 
from bricks and mortar and traditional manufacturing industries 
toward information and technology industries, it has moved in the 
direction of differentiation and heterogeneity of brands.91  But even if 
the liberalization of concentration ratios does not alone signal an 
overall liberalization of merger policy, there is little doubt that 
merger policy is far more liberal today than it was twenty or thirty 
years ago.92
Not only have the agencies’ relaxed their formal concentration 
criteria in merger cases, but the prospects for defendant victories in 
litigated cases have improved dramatically in the last several 
decades.  In dissenting in Von’s Grocery in 1966, Justice Stewart 
could comment sarcastically that “[t]he sole consistency that I can 
find in litigation under Section 7 [of the Clayton Act] is that the 
 
 
89 Under the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, it may no longer be necessary to 
define a relevant market in every case.  HMG § 4 (“Some of the analytical tools 
used by the Agencies to assess competitive effects do not rely on market definition 
. . .”).  See also Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 437 
(2010) (arguing that market definition is incoherent and unproductive in antitrust 
cases). 
90 Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines:  From Hedgehog to Fox 
in Forty Years, 77 Antitrust L. J. 49, 54 (2010). 
91 CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO 
THE NETWORK ECONOMY 22-23 (1999) (describing characteristics of information 
economies). 
92 See generally, D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust, Institutions, and Merger Control, 17 
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1055, 1128-29 (2010) (reporting survey of antitrust 
practitioners reporting ambiguous views as to whether merger enforcement at the 
Justice Department was more lenient in the Bush administration than in the Clinton 
Administration and a uniform view that merger review at the FTC was not more 
lenient under Bush than under Clinton). 
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Government always wins.”93  Even as late as the early 1980s, Fisher 
and Lande asserted that “defendant merger victories not surprisingly 
have been relatively rare.”94  If anything, the trend in the last decade 
has been toward defendant victories in litigated merger cases, with 
prominent government defeats in cases like Oracle/PeoplesSoft95 and 
Arch Coal.96  During the 2000s, defendants won half of the 
preliminary injunction actions brought by the FTC or Justice 
Department.97
Although the European model of merger review is quite different 
from the American model and European merger control generally 
tighter than American merger control,
  To the extent that the shadow of the law plays a 
significant role in the regulatory administration of mergers, the 
calculus has shifted in a decidedly pro-merger direction. 
98 Europe has seen a similar 
trend toward a more active judicial role in questioning European 
Commission decisions prohibiting mergers in the last decade.  During 
the early-2000s in particular, the European Court of Justice reversed 
the Commission’s merger prohibition decision in a surprising string 
of cases that departed significantly from the Court’s prior willingness 
to accord the Commission discretion in merger cases.99  Since those 
decisions, the Commission seems to have become considerably more 
cautious in its prohibition decisions, to the point that some academic 
commentators and Commission officials wonder whether it has 
become too lenient in merger enforcement.100
There is no doubt that merger policy in both the U.S. and the EU 
is more liberal than it was three decades ago in the U.S. or a decade 
  
 
93 United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). 
94 Fisher & Lande, supra n. xxx at 1583. 
95 U.S. v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
96 FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2004). 
97 According to the agencies’ joint Hart-Scott-Rodino Act annual reports, available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/anncompreports.shtm, the agencies won six preliminary 
injunction cases and lost six during the period 2000-2009.   
98 Mats A. Bergman, Malcolm B. Coate, Maria Jakobsson & Shawn W. Ulrick, 
Comparing Merger Policies: The European Union versus the United States, 07-01 
Potomac Papers L. & Econ. (2007) (finding that European horizontal merger policy 
is generally more restrictive than U.S. merger policy). 
99 See Francisco Todorov & Anthony Valcke, Judicial Review of Merger Control 
Decisions in the European Union, Antitrust Bulletin June 22, 2006. 
100 See Frank Maier-Rigaud & Kay Parplies, EU Merger Control Five Years After 
the Introduction of the SIEC Test:  What Explains the Drop in Enforcement 
Activity?, [2009] E.C.L.R. 565. 
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and a half ago in Europe.  What is impossible to say to any great 
certainty is whether solicitude over merger efficiencies has 
significantly influenced this trend.  Whether or not it has, the 
comparatively liberal state of merger policy today has implications 
for any reconsideration of the asymmetrical treatment of merger 
anticompetitive risks and efficiencies.  Any movement toward greater 
consideration of merger efficiencies could propel overall merger 
policy in a yet more lenient direction, which could in turn induce 
political backlash against the overall trend in merger policy.101
 
 
C.  Effects on Distribution of Proposed and Challenged Mergers  
 
The apparent implication of re-valuing merger efficiencies 
relative to anticompetitive effects is that courts and regulators would 
begin to permit some number of marginal mergers that they 
previously would have disallowed. To the extent that the antitrust 
system is currently disallowing or discouraging a significant number 
of beneficial mergers, a reorientation of the relevant legal and 
administrative norms could result in net social welfare improvement.  
Indeed, the mergers currently screened out by prevailing norms may 
be precisely the most beneficial ones.  Jamie Moffitt argues that the 
courts’ hostility to merger efficiency defenses chills businesses’ 
willingness to propose “exactly those [deals] that have the greatest 
potential to enhance competition”—high-efficiency transactions in 
concentrated industries.102
On the other hand, viewed as a proposal to liberalize merger 
policy, the normative appeal of the symmetry principle seems to 
depend not merely on its internal logic but on some prior belief that 
contemporary merger policy in the U.S., EU, or other jurisdiction is 
excessively restrictive.  Since many commentators believe that U.S. 
 
 
101 Significantly, as a presidential candidate, Senator Barack Obama targeted the 
Bush Administration’s merger policy for criticism: “Regrettably, the current 
administration has what may be the weakest record of antitrust enforcement of any 
administration in the last half-century. As president, I will direct my administration 
to reinvigorate antitrust enforcement. It will step up review of merger activity and 
take effective action to stop or restructure those mergers that are likely to harm 
consumer welfare, while quickly clearing those that do not.”  Senator Barack 
Obama, Statement for the American Antitrust Institute 2 (Sept. 27, 2007), available 
at www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/aai-%20Presidential%20campaign%-
̈%20Obama%209-07_092720071759.pdf. 
102 Moffitt, supra n. xxx at 1743. 
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merger policy in particular has already become too permissive,103
But revaluing merger efficiencies relative to anticompetitive 
effects does not require holding constant the rest of merger policy.  
Even without any formal adjustment to other aspects of merger law, 
revaluing merger efficiencies could end up having no net effect on 
overall merger policy liberality.  Indeed, an explicit symmetry 
principle could induce legal decision-makers to give greater credence 
to anticompetitive effects theories in some cases than they presently 
do.  Several possible systemic reactions to an enhanced willingness 
by agencies or courts to credit merger efficiencies arguments point 
toward neutrality in overall merger leniency. 
 the 
mere internal logic of the symmetry principle may seem an 
insufficient reason to recalibrate merger policy in favor of even more 
liberal merger review. 
First, assuming that Fisher and Lande’s proposal to embed prior 
beliefs about merger efficiencies in overall leniency toward mergers 
captures part of the influence for merger liberalization in the last 
several decades, then a higher valuation of efficiencies could alter 
courts’ and agencies’ overall willingness to prohibit certain classes of 
mergers.  Assuming that merger control institutions display an 
unconscious tendency to increase the threshold of proof required for 
anticompetitive effects theories because they are prohibited, 
culturally or legally, from giving significant weight to merger 
efficiencies arguments, then a reversal of the norm on efficiencies 
could also lead to a reversal of the norm on anticompetitive effects 
theories. 
Second, alteration in the efficiencies norm could alter overall 
regulatory or legal decision-making processes on mergers by 
affecting judges or regulators’ assessment of the probability of 
anticompetitive effects. Decision-makers asked to assign a 
probability value to two related events may anchor their 
determination of one event’s probability on their assessment of the 
 
103 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger 
Enforcement, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK:  THE EFFECT 
OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 235 (Robert Pitofsky, 
ed., 2008) (criticizing recent U.S. merger enforcement as excessively lax); William 
E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies:  What Constitutes Good 
Performance?, 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 903, 915 (2009) (reporting that 
commentators have called U.S. merger enforcement excessively lax). 
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other event’s probability.104
One might object that if judges or regulators systematically raised 
their estimates of future anticompetitive effects if faced with 
efficiencies defenses, then merging parties would have diminished 
incentives to make efficiencies claims in the first place. If that were 
to occur, the agencies might respond by affirmatively insisting that 
the merging parties in close-call cases provide the efficiencies 
justifications for their mergers. Then there is a question of net effects. 
If the only effect of adopting the symmetry principle were that judges 
and regulators would become less skeptical of anticompetitive effects 
claims, then the symmetrical treatment project would not result in a 
true re-valuation of merger efficiencies and, indeed, would seem 
pointless.  But even if revaluing efficiencies defenses did not lead to 
an overall increase in the number of permitted mergers, it could still 
have a salutary effect on the selection of mergers that are permitted 
and prohibited.  In the class of marginal merger cases—the class 
most likely to be affected by any adjustment in legal principle—there 
might well be a socially beneficial increase in permission for mergers 
creating net consumer (or social) benefits and a corresponding 
decrease in mergers creating net consumer (or social) harm.   
 Judges or regulators asked to decide on 
the absolute probability that a merger will produce anticompetitive 
effects might tend to low-ball the probability because of a general 
skeptical inclination as to proof of speculative future events, but raise 
their estimate of the probability of harms if asked to assess that 
probability at the same time that they were assessing the probability 
of efficiencies.  
Finally, it is possible that antitrust regulators have an 
exogenously determined appetite for merger prohibition decisions, in 
effect a “merger quota” that they need to fill regardless of the merits 
of individual merger applications.  Within a particular political and 
economic context, regulators may approach merger control with a 
rough and perhaps unconscious sense of the number of prohibition 
decisions (or, more generally, requirements that parties restructure 
questionable deals) they need to produce in order to justify their 
budgetary allocations, show themselves sufficiently tough but not 
obstacles to business progress, and satisfy political demand for 
 
104 See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Sci. 1124, 1128 (1974); Amos Tversky & 
Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251 
(1986). 
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“action from Washington or Brussels.”  Much of the ideological 
discourse about the stringency of antitrust activity consists of 
counting up merger challenges and other antitrust enforcement 
activity within particular administrations.105
It is impossible to demonstrate or quantify the effect of any of 
these factors with certainty, but it seems probable that the relative 
coolness to merger efficiency arguments may not simply diminish the 
number of procompetitive mergers with high efficiencies, but alter 
the overall portfolio of mergers that firms consider and propose and 
that agencies and courts allow and prohibit.  This by itself is not a 
sufficient reason to adopt a symmetry principle whereby efficiencies 
and harms of equal weight and probability should be equally 
weighted.  It is, however, a reason to scrutinize the set of possible 
justifications for the principle of asymmetry embedded in U.S. and 
EU law and practice and currently being emulated by the scores of 
merger control regimes developing around the world.
  If even a soft and 
fluctuating merger quota exists, then a decision to revalue 
efficiencies could lead to an increase in permission for some 
categories of mergers and a decrease in permission for other 
categories. 
106
III. SOURCES OF HOSTILITY TO MERGER EFFICIENCIES 
 
Neither U.S. nor EU law—including the relevant statutory or 
treaty provisions, implementing regulations or enforcement 
guidelines, and case law—contains an explicit acknowledgment of, 
or justification or, the asymmetry between predictive harms and 
efficiencies described in the previous section.  To be sure, numerous 
statements as to the reasons for downplaying efficiencies defenses 
appear from time to time, but the relevant legal sources make no 
effort to provide a systematic account for the asymmetry.  This 
section identifies and critically evaluates seven possible 
justifications. 
 
 
 
 
105 See, e.g.,  Kovacic, supra n. xxx at 915 (responding to criticisms of Bush era 
merger enforcement). 
106 Fox & Crane, supra n. xxx 451 (discussing proliferation of merger control 
regimes around the globe). 
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A.  Productive Efficiencies Do Not Always Benefit Consumers 
 
The most probable explanation for the asymmetry is an implicit 
concern that any efficiencies generated by the merger will be 
captured by the merging firms, but not passed onto consumers.  Since 
Oliver Williamson’s seminal article in 1968,107
Where mergers generate total welfare increases but diminish 
consumer welfare, the merger-control regime must decide whether to 
accept a total welfare or consumer welfare (or, allocative efficiency, 
its cognate) standard.  In both the U.S. and the EU, the currently 
prevailing regimes seem to favor a consumer welfare standard. Under 
EU law, any merger efficiencies must be sufficient to offset the 
anticompetitive impact on consumers,
 it has been well 
understood that mergers can simultaneously generate efficiencies and 
consumer harm if the merging firms appropriate the efficiencies 
solely for themselves as cost savings and fail to pass them onto 
consumers.  Total societal welfare may be maximized if the cost 
savings exceed the sum of the consumer deadweight losses (and 
wealth transfers, if we count those as social costs), and yet consumer 
welfare may fall. 
108 which means that cost 
savings from mergers that are not passed onto consumers 
normatively count for nothing.  The U.S. agencies are less clear on 
this point, but the bottom line seems to be a commitment to a 
consumer welfare perspective.  The current guidelines state that 
“[t]he Agencies will not challenge a merger if cognizable efficiencies 
are of a character and magnitude such that the merger is not likely to 
be anticompetitive in any relevant market” and that “the Agencies 
consider whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to 
reverse the merger’s potential to harm customers in the relevant 
market, e.g., by preventing price increases in that market.”109
By contrast, Canada explicitly follows a total welfare standard, 
with apparent implications for the relative weighting of efficiencies 
and harms.  The Canadian Competition Act not only allows a merger 
defense, but also commits Canada to a total welfare standard for 
mergers under which predicted harms are to be balanced against cost 
 
 
107 Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense:  The Welfare 
Tradeoffs, 58 Am. Econ. Rev. 18 (1968). 
108 EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, ¶ 79. 
109 HMG §  10. 
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savings from the merger, whether or not those savings are ultimately 
passed on to consumers.  Canadian case law calls for a ‘balancing 
weights standard” under which “any increase in surplus arising from 
the efficiency gain from the merger is balanced against the 
deadweight loss resulting from the likely anti-competitive effects of 
the merger and, where appropriate, some portion (including possibly 
all or none) of the associated transfer of surplus from consumers to 
producers.”110  Canadian law places the burden of proving harms on 
the Competition Bureau and the burden of proving offsetting benefits 
on the merging parties,111
The American and European commitment to a consumer welfare 
criterion for merger review may provide a strong positive explanation 
for the asymmetrical treatment of harms and efficiencies, but not a 
normatively appealing one.  Even assuming that normative 
commitment to consumer welfare rather than total social welfare is 
appropriate, this is no reason to discriminate against efficiencies in 
the probability requirement.  If the commitment to the consumer 
welfare objective is what motivates the dismissal of certain forms of 
efficiency defenses, then the hostility to efficiencies claims should be 
limited to those that are not passed onto consumers.  Instead, both the 
American and European guidelines cut twice against efficiencies 
defenses, first by insisting that only consumer-benefiting efficiencies 
be recognized and second by requiring heightened proof as to even 
consumer-benefiting efficiencies. 
 but seems to place no greater weight on 
either side of the scale. 
One might respond that the guidelines are not really double-
discounting efficiencies but rather reflecting the fact that antitrust 
agencies will cast a jaundiced eye on efficiencies claims since 
efficiencies often will not benefit consumers.  But casting a jaundiced 
eye at efficiencies writ large would only be appropriate if the 
agencies did not have adequate tools for predicting which merger 
efficiencies will be passed onto consumers and which will be 
appropriated by the merging firms.  In fact, antitrust economics has 
robust predictive tools for making those determinations.  Generally, it 
 
110 Canadian Competition Bureau Bulletin, Efficiencies in Merger Review, (March 
2, 2009), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/02982.html 
(citing Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Superior Propane Inc. (August 
30, 2000), CT-1998/002 (Canadian Competition Tribunal)). 
111 Id. 
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is well understood that fixed cost savings are likely to be 
appropriated by the merging firms but that marginal cost savings are 
likely to be passed on, to some degree, to consumers.112  Economists 
have developed models for determining the level of marginal cost 
reductions necessary to prevent price increases in unilateral effects 
cases in differentiated goods,113 and separately in coordinated 
interaction cases involving homogeneous products.114 Other 
economic work shows that, as a general matter, fifty percent should 
be the minimum pass-through for marginal cost reductions.115
In light of the sophistication of economic knowledge on whether 
merger efficiencies are likely to be passed along to consumers, there 
is no reason for undifferentiated hostility to efficiencies defenses 
even if a jurisdiction believes that only consumer-benefiting 
efficiencies should count.  Given those priors, the appropriate 
approach is to require evidence of consumer-benefiting efficiencies, 
not to cast a pall over efficiencies claims as a class. 
 
One institutional explanation for the asymmetry of treatment is 
that the lawyer class in the antitrust agencies distrusts the economist 
class.  As a class, economists (including many of the staff economists 
working in the antitrust enforcement agencies) tend to support a total 
welfare standard for antitrust, believing that antitrust is a poor vehicle 
for addressing distributive concerns.116
 
112 See Kenneth Heyer, Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis:  Why Not the 
Best?, Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper (March 2006), 
http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/pdf/references/heyer-ken-06-8.pdf. 
  By contrast, the lawyer 
113 G. Werden, “A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers among 
Sellers of Differentiated Products,” 44 J. INDUS. ECON. 409 (1996).  
114 L. Froeb & G. Werden, “A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing 
Mergers among Sellers of  a Homogeneous Product,” US Dept. of Justice Antitrust 
Division, Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper 97-1 (1997). 
115 J. Hausman and G. Leonard, “Efficiencies From the Consumer Viewpoint,” 7 
GEO. L. REV. 707 (1999); but see O. Ashenfelter, “Identifying the Firm-Specific 
Cost Pass-Through Rate,” FTC Bureau of Economics Working Paper No. 217 
(1998)(estimating 21% pass through rate for Office Depot/Staples merger). 
116 See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden, Monoposony and the Sherman Act:  Consumer 
Welfare in a New Light, 74 Antitrust L. J. 707, 708 n. 5 (2007) (“Many economists 
advocate what is termed a total surplus or total welfare standard); Kenneth Heyer, 
Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis:  Why Not the Best?, Competition Pol’y 
Int’l, Autumn 2006, at 29 (arguing for total welfare standard); William J. Kolasky 
& Andrew R. Dick, 71 Antitrust L. J. 207, 230 (2003) (noting that most economists 
argue for a total welfare approach); Fisher & Lande, supra n. xxx at 1649 (“[M]ost 
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class—reflecting the “consumer welfare” perspective of the courts 
and a moralistic concern about wealth redistribution and consumer 
“rights—tends to prefer a consumer welfare standard.117
This asymmetry in perspective between the economist and lawyer 
classes shows up in empirical work concerning the separate analysis 
of efficiency claims by lawyers working in the FTC’s Bureau of 
Competition and the lawyers working in the Bureau of Economics.
   
118  
In the study of internal staff reports regarding 147 transactions for 
which a second request for documents119 was issued, the study’s 
authors found that the Bureau of Competition’s lawyers accepted 
eight percent of efficiencies claimed by the merging parties whereas 
the Bureau of Economics’ economists accepted twenty-seven percent 
of the parties’ efficiency claims.120
Empirical work has shown that the lawyer class tends to 
predominate in influence over the economist class in the antitrust 
enforcement agencies.
  The FTC’s economists seem to 
lend considerably greater credence to efficiencies claims than do 
their lawyer peers. 
121
 
economists argue that antitrust law are a very poor method of wealth redistribution, 
and that sound public policy requires one to separate redistribution concerns 
completely from efficiencies analysis”); Kenneth Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust:  
Other than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1191 (1977) (summarizing economic arguments in favor of an efficiency standard). 
  The devaluation of merger efficiencies in 
the merger guidelines and in case law may reflect the lawyer class’s 
effort to prevent the emergence of an implicit total welfare standard.  
The mere articulation of the consumer welfare standard in guidelines 
117 See, e.g., John B. Kirkwood, Buyer Power and Exclusionary Conduct:  Should 
Brooke Group Set the Standards for Buyer-Induced Price Discrimination and 
Predatory Bidding?, 72 Antitrust L. J. 625, 631 n. 11 (2005) (observing that “many 
leading law professors” prefer a consumer welfare standard). 
118 Malcolm B. Coate & Andrew J. Heimert, Merger Efficiencies at the Federal 
Trade Commission, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/0902mergerefficiencies.pdf. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Malcolm B. Coate, Richard S. Higgins & Fred S. McChesney, Beaucracy and 
Politics in FTC Merger Challenges, in THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
ANTITRUST: A PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 213-230 (Fred S. McChesney & 
William F. Shughart II eds.,1995) (finding based on empirical study that a 
“disagreement between economists and lawyers about whether to challenge a 
merger is not a ‘fair fight.’  Lawyers have greater influence with the commission 
over the decision.”). 
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and case law may be perceived (consciously or unconsciously) as 
insufficient to ensure that only consumer welfare enhancing 
efficiencies count in the relevant calculus.  
 
B.  Efficiencies Claims Are Difficult to Prove 
 
One possible reason for the marginalization of efficiencies 
defenses is that efficiencies may be difficult to prove.  Both the U.S. 
Horizontal Guidelines and the agencies’ Commentaries on the 
guidelines note that many purported efficiencies are simply never 
proven or could be achieved in ways less restrictive of 
competition.122  Even in cases where the merging parties prevail in 
court or before the agencies in arguing that merger is unlikely to 
create anticompetitive effects, they often lose on the question of 
whether they have shown offsetting efficiencies. Thus, for example, 
in the Oracle-PeopleSoft litigation, Judge Walker rejected the Justice 
Department’s anticompetitive effects claims, but also rejected 
Oracle’s efficiency justifications as unproven.123
The justification for this systematic skepticism that efficiencies 
claims have not been proven with adequate certainty cannot be just 
that the efficiencies claims concern a future event—the parties’ cost 
curve following the consummation of the merger—and hence are 
inherently speculative.  Predictions about anticompetitive share the 
same property—they rely on probabilistic efforts to divine the 
future.
 
124
A more serious objection is that the current state of economic 
thinking has robust tools for establishing anticompetitive effects but 
not such robust models for forecasting efficiencies.  Hence, one 
might believe that given specified demand diversion ratios, unilateral 
anticompetitive effects of a certain magnitude are highly likely to 
follow if the merging parties are the producers of each other’s best 
substitutes.  One might also believe that predictions about how 
combining productive inputs such as factories, machines, intellectual 
property, or distribution channels are inherently speculative because 
 
 
122 Department of Justice and FTC Commentary on the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, § 4 (March 2006), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247.htm#46. 
123 U.S. v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
124 See infra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx. 
31
Crane:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2011
FORTHCOMING 110 MICH. L. REV. (2011)  
2011] Rethinking Merger Efficiencies 33 
 
  
there are no tested and reliable models for predicting such effects.125
But this explanation—even if an accurate positive account—does 
not provide a strong normative justification for the asymmetrical 
treatment of costs and benefits. For one, in at least one 
circumstance—innovation theory—the antitrust authorities treat 
harms and efficiencies asymmetrically even though they derive from 
the identical mechanism—innovation through research and 
development.  Under the 2010 guidelines, the agencies highlight 
concerns over the reduction of innovation incentives as a possible 
anticompetitive effect of mergers.  For example, Section 6.4 of the 
guidelines state that “[t]he Agencies may consider whether a merger 
is likely to diminish innovation competition by encouraging the 
merged firm to curtail its innovative efforts below the level that 
would prevail in the absence of the merger.”
  
Combining these two prior beliefs, one would then approach 
anticompetitive effects stories with greater credulity than efficiencies 
stories. 
126  On the other hand, 
when discussing efficiencies defenses, the guidelines state that 
research and development synergies “are potentially substantial but 
are generally less susceptible to verification and may be the result of 
anticompetitive output reductions.”127  Some economists claim that 
innovation effects from mergers are too speculative to predict with 
anything approaching scientific rigor,128 but that should lead to equal 
discounting of innovation-harm theories and innovation-enhancement 
defenses.  The guidelines appear to give ordinary credence to 
innovation-harm theories even while discounting innovation-
enhancement defenses.  Whether or not this is justified in some way, 
the explanation cannot be a difference in prior beliefs about the 
likelihood that innovation effects can be proven to an adequate level 
of probability.129
 
125 One might simultaneously believe that there are good models for predicting 
whether marginal cost savings will be passed onto consumers, see supra xxx, and 
that there are not good models for predicting whether mergers will achieve 
marginal cost savings. 
  
126 HMG, § 6.4. 
127 Id. , § 10. 
128 See, e.g., Richard Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market Approach 
to Merger Analysis, 64 Antitrust L. J.  19 (1995). 
129 Empirical work has shown, albeit weakly, that the FTC staff tend to give greater 
weight to dynamic efficiency claims than to static efficiency claims, suggesting an 
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Beyond the example of inconsistency with respect to innovation 
theories, the asymmetrical treatment of harms and benefits cannot be 
justified conceptually based on the relative differences in strength of 
probabilistic proof.  The fact that parties may not be able to prove 
efficiencies in fact does not justify maintaining a different standard 
of proof.  It is circular to say that efficiencies should not be lightly 
used to justify potentially anticompetitive mergers because 
efficiencies are difficult to prove, and then reject a particular instance 
of purported efficiencies because it failed to meet the high standard 
of proof. 
 
C.  Mergers Are Driven By Kingdom-Building Rather than 
Increasing Shareholder Value 
 
A related explanation for efficiency claim scepticism may derive 
from a general suspicion that mergers are driven by corporate 
managers eager to enlarge their “fiefdoms” rather than by 
maximizing returns to shareholders.  Various empirical studies have 
shown that many large corporate mergers generate negative 
shareholder returns.130  For instance, Scherer and Ravenscraft 
showed that the massive merger wave that peaked during the 1960s 
resulted in manufacturing inefficiencies that reduced U.S. real gross 
national product by between 0.074 and 0.101 percentage points 
between 1968 and 1976.131
 
implicit inflation in the value of dynamic efficiency claims to match the staff’s 
overall willingness to accept dynamic inefficiency claims (i.e., theories of harm to 
innovation incentives resulting from the post-merger exercise of market power).  
Coate & Heimert, supra n. xxx at 19. 
  Carl Shapiro, the current Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General for Economics at the Antitrust division 
has taken the position that “the evidence from the finance, 
managerial, and economics literatures shows that many mergers do 
not work out well . . . This evidence certainly does not support the 
view that merger-specific efficiencies are common or that claims of 
130 See, e.g., DAVID J. RAVENSCRAFT & F.M. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-OFFS, AND 
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY (1987). 
131 F.M. Scherer, A New Retrospective on Mergers, 28 Rev. Indus. Org. 327, 329 
(2006) (reporting on key findings from earlier book). 
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efficiencies made by merging parties should generally be 
credited.”132
But even assuming that this empire-building/agency cost account 
of merger activity is true as to some portion of mergers,
 
133 it does not 
provide a sufficient reason for a merger policy asymmetry between 
costs and efficiencies either.  Even if large corporate mergers as a 
class systematically fail to generate efficiencies, that finding provides 
relatively little information on the likelihood that the specific class of 
mergers under consideration in difficult merger review decisions are 
inherently unlikely to create efficiencies.  For instance, Scherer and 
Ravenscraft’s study focused on conglomerate mergers, which are not 
generally a subject of antitrust scrutiny.134  As Scherer has written 
more recently, “[o]ne might expect opportunities for cost savings and 
benefits from complementarity to be much stronger for horizontal 
and vertical mergers than for conglomerates, and so the record of 
widespread failure we documented may simply have become 
irrelevant.”135
 
  As to the class of mergers in which the efficiency 
defense generally comes into play, there is no reason for strong prior 
beliefs as to whether efficiencies are likely or unlikely. 
  D.  Counterattacking Optimism Bias 
 
A possible justification related to, but analytically distinct from, 
the last two discussed is that governments and courts need to adjust 
the standard of proof because proposed mergers are systemically 
 
132 Jonathan B. Baker and Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger 
Enforcement,” paper presented at the Kirkpatrick Conference on Conservative 
Economic Influence on U.S. Antitrust Policy, Georgetown University Law Center, 
October 2007, available at: http:// 
faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/SHAPIRO/mergerpolicy.pdf. 
133 There are, of course, competing views.  See, e.g., G. BENSTON, CONGLOMERATE 
MERGERS:  CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REMEDIES (1980). 
134 Alan Devlin, Antitrust in an Era of Market Failure, 33 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 
557, 596 (2010) (“Conglomerate mergers, which are combinations of firms that are 
neither vertically nor horizontally related, do not bear the potential for unilateral or 
coordinated price effects and have not been an object of U.S. antitrust concern in 
this generation.”). 
135 Scherer, supra n. xxx at 330. 
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biased toward over-optimism.136 Generically, business managers 
make overly optimistic predictions about the future success of their 
firms, including the efficiencies that they could capture from a 
merger.137  Thus, if one were to take the set of all mergers that 
managers consider, ask the managers to predict what efficiencies they 
might capture from the merger, and then track actual results post-
merger, one would expect that sum of captured efficiencies would be 
less than the sum predicted by managers.  Further, not all managers 
who consider mergers carry through with the idea.  The ones most 
likely actually to propose a merger are the most optimistic ones.  
Hence, the set of merger proposals antitrust agencies have to screen 
may be skewed toward systemic over optimism.138
The problem with this justification for a differential standard of 
proof for efficiencies and harms is that it assumes that only one side 
of the ledger manifests bias.  In order to justify a principle of legal or 
administrative asymmetry, it would need to be the case that the 
proponents of theories of harm manifest a lesser degree of systemic 
bias than the proponents of efficiencies.  In civil litigation, for 
example, it is obvious that the plaintiffs are biased to see the facts 
most favorably to themselves and hence bring many meritless cases.  
This would be a good reason to require proof by a standard greater 
than preponderance of the evidence except for the fact that 
defendants are equally biased in the direction of denying liability and 
  Since regulators 
and courts lack good information on which mergers would actually 
generate efficiencies, they may need to respond to this systemic bias 
by requiring particularly compelling proof of efficiencies. 
 
136 Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806 (1980) (describing phenomenon of 
optimism bias). 
137 Anand Mohan Goel & Anjan V. Thakor, Rationality, Overconfidence and 
Leadership 3-4 (Univ. of Mich. Ross Sch. of Bus. Working Paper Series, Working 
Paper No. 00-022, 2000), available at http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/35648 
(showing that overconfident managers are more likely to be selected as leaders than 
less confident managers). 
138 Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Detecting and Reversing the Decline in 
Horizontal Merger Enforcement, 22- SUM-Antitrust 29, 33 (2008) (“There is 
considerable evidence that acquiring firms are systematically over-optimistic about 
the efficiencies they can achieve through acquisition .... This evidence does not 
support the view that merger-specific efficiencies are common or that claims of 
efficiencies made by merging parties should generally be credited.”). 
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seeking exculpation.  The accommodation is that the fact-finder must 
scrutinize each side of the ledger with some degree of scepticism, 
although the standard of proof remains set at equipoise (except in 
those cases where, for collateral reasons, some higher degree of proof 
is preferred).139
Conceding that merger proponents are biased to believe that 
efficiencies will result, what is the evidence that merger opponents 
are neutral with respect to anticompetitive effects?  The first class of 
relevant merger opponents are the business interests that sometimes 
mobilize to persuade the antitrust agencies to block a merger.  For 
example, when Google announced its intention to purchase ITA 
Software, a provider of software services to Internet travel search 
sites, a coalition of rivals including Microsoft, Tripadvisor, Expedia, 
K ayak, and Hotwire launched a public relations campaign to 
convince antitrust enforcers to block the deal.
 
140 T he E uropean 
Commission’s decision to block GE’s acquisition of Honeywell may 
have been influenced by GE’s competitors, concerned about a more 
powerful rival.141
Often, the pressures against mergers are more subtle and, indeed, 
difficult to assess.  Rivals of the merging firms have complex 
incentives.  They may disfavor the merger because it creates a 
stronger competitor, favor the merger because it creates a more 
concentrated market in which tacit collusion is easier, disfavor the 
merger because it creates a more concentrated market which makes 
the rivals’  own future acquisitions harder to justify, or favor agency 
approval because it sets a precedent for their own future deals (on the 
theory that competition in the market is robust).
  It is not unusual to observe competitors scrambling 
to oppose mergers that may diminish their relative standing in the 
market. 
142
 
139 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006). 
  It is impossible to 
capture the direction or magnitude of this bias as a class.  Customers 
140 The coalition’s website is fairsearch.org. 
141 Eleanor M. Fox, GE/Honeywell:  The U.S. Merger that Europe Stopped—A 
Story of the Politics of Convergence, in ANTITRUST STORIES 339 (Eleanor M. Fox 
& Daniel A. Crane, eds, 2007) (reporting that teams of lawyers from United 
Technology, Rolls-Royce, and Rockwell Collins visited European Commission’s 
Directorate General for Competition to complain about the GE/Honeywell deal). 
142 See generally HMG § 2.2.3 (discussing difficulties with relying on competitors’ 
opinions in merger cases). 
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also have incentives with respect to mergers of their suppliers that are 
difficult to map. 143
A  second kind of bias concerns the incentives of antitrust 
enforcers.  Public choice literature suggests that antitrust enforcers 
are not merely detached public servants on a truth-seeking 
expedition.
 
144
T his is not to say that antitrust enforcers are untrustworthy as a 
class.  R ather, it is to acknowledge that systemic bias in merger 
control is not unilateral.  Unless one believes that the optimism bias 
of merger proponents is so strong that it swamps all other 
influences—a proposition without substantial support—there is no 
reason to deviate from symmetry in the standards of proof for 
efficiencies and harms. 
  T hey are susceptible to all of the usual biases and 
influences of regulators.  T hey may oppose mergers in order to 
aggrandize their own agency’ s influence, justify their agency’ s 
budget, get into newspaper headlines, support a political party’ s 
standing, pacify a member of Congress, advance an ideological 
agenda, or promote their individual careers.   
 
  E.  Efficiencies Create Undue Dominance 
 
The previous lines of argument rested on skepticism that mergers 
often generate efficiencies.  A different line of argument accepts that 
mergers often do generate efficiencies and affirmatively counts them 
against the merger on the theory that efficiencies acquired through 
merger upset the balance of the playing field and tend toward long-
run dominance in the merging firms.   
This suspicion of merger efficiencies as creating unwholesome 
competitive advantages has a storied history in U.S. case law.  In 
Brown Shoe, the court found that the efficiencies created by vertical 
integration between a shoe manufacturing company and a shoe 
retailer counted against a vertical mergers since “by eliminating 
wholesalers and by increasing the volume of purchases from the 
manufacturing division of the enterprise, [the merging parties] can 
 
143 Ken Heyer, Predicting the Competitive Effects of Mergers by Listening to 
Customers, 74 Antitrust L. J. 87 (2007). 
144 See generally THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST: A PUBLIC 
CHOICE PERSPECTIVE (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995). 
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market their own brands at prices below those of competing 
independent retailers.”145  The FTC extended this view in In re 
Foremost Dairies,146 where it rejected a dairy industry merger that 
would likely have resulted in significant synergies and access to 
capital markets.147 The Commission held that a showing “that the 
acquiring firm possesses significant market power in some markets 
or that its overall organization gives it a decided advantage in 
efficiency over its smaller rivals” demonstrates a violation of Section 
7 of the Clayton Act.148 In Procter & Gamble, the Supreme Court 
back away from the view that efficiencies could count against a 
merger, holding that they could count neither for nor against a 
merger.149  Procter & Gamble remains, by virtue of inertia, the 
official position in Supreme Court jurisprudence, although the Court 
has not decided a merger case since 1976 and it is doubtful that it 
would follow that position today.150
On the European side, something similar may have happened in 
GE/Honeywell.  The Commission’s portfolio effects theory depended 
on a prediction that the combination of the resources of GE’s various 
divisions, including GE Capital and GE’s engine divisions, with 
Honeywell’s avionics products would allow the merged firms to 
charge lower prices to their consumers and hence distort the level 
playing field.
 
151  Although Mario Monti—the EC’s Competition 
Commissioner-denied that the portfolio effects theory was a rejection 
of an efficiency defense,152
 
145 Brown Shoe Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). 
 it is hard to understand the argument as 
anything other.  The specific theories invoked, such as the 
146 60 F.T.C. 944 (1962), modified, 67 F.T.C. 282 (1965). 
147 Id. at 1083-84. 
148 Id. at 1084. 
149 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) (“Possible economies 
cannot be used as a defense to illegality.  Congress was aware that some mergers 
which lessen competition may also result in economies but it struck the balance in 
favor of protecting competition.”). 
150 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra n. xxx ¶ 970c1 at 31 (“The Court’s brief and 
unelaborated language cannot reasonably be taken as a definitive disposition of so 
important and complex an issue as the proper role of economies in analyzing the 
legality of a merger.”). 
151 See Eleanor M. Fox, GE/Honeywell:  The U.S. Merger that Europe Stopped—A 
Story of the Politics of Convergence, in ANTITRUST STORIES (Eleanor M. Fox & 
Daniel A. Crane, eds, 2007). 
152 Id. at 344. 
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elimination of double marginalization through bundling and 
leveraging the ability to extend credit across larger commercial 
enterprises, are precisely the kinds of efficiency defenses often raised 
in vertical and horizontal cases.  The Commission also appeared to 
hold efficiencies against the merger in two earlier cases, 
Areospatiale/Havilland and Boeing/McDonnell Douglas,153 and in a 
more recent case, Vodafone AirTouch/Mannesmann.154
Assuming for the sake of argument that merger efficiencies 
sometimes destabilize competition and create market dominance, this 
is not a reason for undifferentiated hostility to merger efficiencies.  
Even if some merger efficiencies harm competition, this is surely a 
minority of all merger cases.  The merging firms may be merging 
simply to catch up with other firms that have already achieved 
particular efficiencies.  Or, other non-merging firms have alternative 
paths for matching efficiencies generated by the merging parties and 
a new incentive to do so. 
 
 Moreover, the claim that efficiencies will likely occur and that, 
in the long run, they will destabilize competition to the detriment of 
consumers, is necessarily more speculative on average than a merger 
efficiencies defense since it relies on proof not only that efficiencies 
will occur but that they will subsequently destabilize competition.  It 
makes no sense to hold defendants to a high standard of proof that 
pro-competitive efficiencies will result and simultaneously hold the 
government to a low burden of proof that anti-competitive 
efficiencies will result.  What’s sauce for the goose is sauce for the 
gander. 
 
F.  Status Quo Preference 
 
Another cluster of possible reasons for a principle of asymmetry 
relates to a general preference for the status quo over change.  The 
relevant phenomena could be grouped under a number of different 
headings, including risk aversion, endowment effect, loss aversion, 
status quo bias, and a precautionary principle.  For simplicity, I 
consider them under the headings loss aversion and the precautionary 
principle. 
 
153 Pitofsky, Efficiency Consideration, supra n. xxx at 1423-24. 
154 Philip J. Weiser, Reexamining the Legacy of Dual Regulation:  Reforming Dual 
Merger Review by the DoJ and FTC, 61 Fed. Comm. L. J. 167, 188 (2008). 
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1.  Loss Aversion 
 
Antitrust regulators may react asymmetrically to potential losses 
and gains.  It is well established in behavioral theory that decision 
makers, including regulators, sometimes weight potential losses more 
than potential gains of an equivalent magnitude.155
A more particular explanation for asymmetry concerns the 
political consequences of prohibiting or approving a merger.  An 
antitrust enforcement agency will face blame for price increases 
resulting from a merger but rarely for price decreases that did not 
occur because a merger was wrongly blocked.
  If regulators 
consider the competitive status quo the relevant baseline, then 
anticompetitive effects may count as losses whereas merger-specific 
efficiencies may count as gains.  This would then explain the 
asymmetry principle—that efficiencies must be more certain than 
harms in order to offset the harms. 
156
While loss aversion may explain the asymmetry principle’s 
existence, it cannot justify the principle normatively. Even assuming 
that consumer loss aversion is normatively neutral,
  Hence, the 
agencies have a greater incentive to block mergers that might result 
in gains to consumers than to approve mergers that might result in 
losses to consumers. 
157
 
155 See, e.g., Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive 
Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. Legal Stud. 747 (1990). 
 regulatory loss 
aversion is categorically undesirable unless it channels the 
preferences of political constituents in a democratically legitimate 
way.  There is no good reason to think that consumers, as a class, 
would exhibit loss aversion as to merger decisions as a class.  To be 
sure, the consumers affected by a particular merger—say one 
involving dog food—might exhibit loss aversion as to that particular 
156 For example, commentators have blamed high oil prices on lax merger 
enforcement in the oil industry.  See Public Citizen, Mergers, Manipulation, and 
Mirages: How Oil Companies Keep Gasoline Prices High, and Why the Energy 
Bill Doesn't Help 1 (2004), http://www.citizen.org/documents/oilmergers.pdf (“The 
United States has allowed multiple large, vertically integrated oil companies to 
merge over the last five years, placing control of the market in too few hands. The 
result: uncompetitive domestic gasoline markets.”). 
157 See Matthew D. Adler, Welfare Polls:  A Synthesis, 81 NYU L. Rev. 1875, 1917 
(2006) (describing loss aversion as “a kind of preference distortion”); 
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merger.  But consumers who buy dog good also buy toothpaste, DVD 
players, and life insurance, all of which industries are also subject to 
merger policy.  As to the class of merger activities, they are 
diversified and therefore should prefer a strategy that maximizes their 
overall wellbeing, even if it leads to occasional price increases.158
 
  
Regulatory loss aversion in the merger context seems merely to 
reflect the self-preservationist biases of regulators. 
2.  Precautionary Principle 
  
Another source of status quo bias or preference may derive from 
more general theories of cost-benefit analysis.  Cass Sunstein has 
identified a “precautionary principle” at work in almost every legal 
system.159
As Sunstein notes, however, this principle can be “literally 
paralyzing” because it prohibits both action and inaction.
  Under the precautionary principle, when a new 
behavior—such as the introduction of a new drug—creates a risk of 
harm, the proponents of the new behavior bear a heavy burden of 
disproving the likelihood of harm before the change should be 
allowed.  Thus, for example, if a new drug might cause cancer as a 
side effect, it should be kept off the market until the issue is fully 
studied and the cancer risk ruled out.  Merger harms may thus be 
given more weight than merger efficiencies because the merging 
parties—the proponents of change—bear the burden of ruling out the 
possibility that their activity will lead to harm. 
160
 
158 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if so, What 
Should be Done About It?, 58 Duke L. J. 1013, 1037 (2009) (discussing 
relationship between loss aversion and diversification). 
  For 
example, suppose that the drug creates a 10% risk that 100 people 
will die but a 10% probability that 100 people will be saved.  
Allowing the new drug risks killing 100 people but disallowing the 
new drug also risks killing 100 people.  What is called for in such a 
situation is not an application some a priori principle about avoiding 
risks but rather a cost-benefit analysis given the relative probabilities 
and magnitudes of the respective risks of action and inaction. 
159 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1003 
(2003). 
160 Id. at 1003. 
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Nonetheless, there may be circumstances when some version of 
the precautionary principle carries weight.  The first strain involves 
changes—such as pollution leading to global warming or 
deregulation of nuclear facilities—that entail an uncertain probability 
of irreversible catastrophic consequences.161  The second involves 
changes with uncertain, and potentially unjust, distributive 
consequences.162
The irremediable catastrophic event strain of the precautionary 
principle has no application to mergers.  Merger policy involves 
calculations of risk—bounded predictions—rather than complete 
uncertainty.
  Neither of these strains of precautionary principle 
theory provides support for a principle of asymmetry in merger 
review. 
163  The consequences of anticompetitive mergers, even if 
undesirable, are hardly ever catastrophic.  Most significantly, 
mergers are not irremediable.  It is possible (although difficult) to 
force parties to unwind an anticompetitive merger if they begin to 
exercise anticompetitive power because of the merger.164
If anything, the option to unwind mergers that turn out to be 
anticompetitive suggests that efficiencies should be given more 
weight than theories of harm.  Once a merger is blocked, there is 
virtually no chance that the merger will be allowed at some future 
point.  This is for two reasons.  First, given the time-sensitivity of 
most mergers, deals that are not consummated quickly are usually 
never consummated.
 
165
 
161 Cass R.. Sunstein, Irreversibility, 9 Law, Probability & Risk 227, 235-36 
(2010); Cass R. Sunstein, The Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle, Issues 
in Legal Scholarship, Catastrophic Risks: Prevention, Compensation, and Recovery 
(2007): Article 3, available at [ ]http:// 
  Second, once an agency or court has blocked 
a merger for antitrust reasons, subsequent events will not usually 
provide it an occasion to rethink its position and allow the merger to 
transpire.  If the market remains essentially static, then there will 
www.bepress.com/ils/iss10/art3.; Cass R. 
Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 841 (2006). 
162 See, e.g., Stephen M. Gardiner, A Core Precautionary Principle, 14 J. Pol. Phil. 
33 (2006). 
163 Peter L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk 133, 219 
(1996) (discussing the distinction between and explaining that “uncertainty means 
unknown probabilities,” while risk is measurable). 
164 See, e.g., HMG § 2.1.1 (discussing evidence that might support unwinding of 
consummated merger). 
165 See supra text accompanying notes xxx –xxx.  
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usually be little reason to make a different prediction about 
competitive effects a few years after the initial decision.  If the 
market changes considerably, for example because of entry or exit of 
firms, significant changes in consumer demand, or the introduction of 
new technologies, the merger review calculus of the agencies 
changes but so does the merger calculus of the parties.  One finds 
very few examples of mergers initially prohibited but then allowed a 
few years later. 
The upshot is that the option value of disallowing a merger after 
consummation is greater than the option value of allowing a merger 
after initial prohibition.  Even if the option value of unwinding a 
merger is small given the costs to the agencies and parties, given that 
the option value of allowing a merger in the future is close to zero, 
option theory cuts in favor of either neutrality between harms and 
efficiencies or a slight preference for efficiencies. 
The other argument sometimes made in support of some version 
of the precautionary principle is that because changes in social or 
economic structures—such as mergers—have distributive 
consequences, regulatory decision-makers need to rule out the 
possibility that the distributive changes will be unjust.166  But that 
argument has little to do with merger policy, since regulatory 
decision-makers generally lack good information on the distribution 
of gains and losses from mergers as between classes of consumers.167
The same is true of mergers.  It makes no sense to give more 
weight to merger risks than to benefits of equal probability and 
magnitude.  The risks and benefits simply need to be weighed given 
  
They do know something about the predictive distribution of gains 
and losses as between producers and consumers—and in consumer 
welfare jurisdictions at least insist the net consumer position be 
predicatively positive.  But this is very different from being able to 
predict that a merger will lead to a welfare gain for old people and a 
welfare loss for poorer people, or other such trade-offs within the 
consumer class that might be expected in other regulatory contexts, 
such as those dealing with the side-effects of drug therapies or 
changes in workplace safety rules. 
 
166 See, e.g., Stephen M. Gardiner, A Core Precautionary Principle, 14 J. Pol. Phil. 
33 (2006). 
167 Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1159, 1213-14 
(2008). 
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the best available evidence about their relative probabilities and 
magnitudes. 
 
 
G.  Deconcentration as a Political Value 
 
 A final potential reason for discriminatory treatment of risks and 
efficiencies relates to what Bob Pitosfky has referred to as antitrust’s 
“political content.”168
The “political content” argument could come in two different 
very different flavors, and distinguishing between them is essential to 
testing the soundness of the proposition.  One version of the 
argument—consistent with the mid-twentieth century U.S. 
Congressional concern with a “rising tide of concentration” in the 
American economy
  Perhaps mergers that increase concentration to 
certain thresholds should be barred for political or social reasons, 
even if there are efficiencies sufficient to offset any harms to 
consumers.   
169
The “rising tide” argument depends on an empirical observation 
that a particular nation’s economy has reached a concentration 
danger zone that justifies condemning mergers of a certain threshold, 
even if those mergers are justified by consumer-friendly efficiencies.  
It is far from true that such a case could be made today, certainly at 
least for the American economy.  To take one snapshot, in 1980 the 
U.S. economy had 2.7 million corporations, 1.4 million partnerships, 
—would worry about the overall level of 
concentrated economic power in the private sector.  The other 
version would be concerned about aggregations of market power in 
specific, culturally or politically sensitive industries. 
 
168 Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1051 
(1979). 
169 U.S. v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 276 (1966) (“’The dominant theme 
pervading congressional consideration of the 1950 amendments was a fear of what 
was considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the American 
economy.’ To arrest this ‘rising tide toward concentration into too few hands and to 
halt the gradual demise of the small businessman, Congress decided to clamp down 
with vigor on mergers.”) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 
315 (1962)). 
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and 9.7 million non-farm sole proprietorships.170  Two decades later, 
after a period generally thought to have been characterized by lax 
merger enforcement, the economy had 5.5 million corporations, 2.0 
million partnerships, and 17.7 million non-farm sole 
proprietorships.171
Further, even if one were to find “rising tide” arguments 
generally appealing, there is an instrumental mismatch between a 
deconcentration policy objective and hostility to efficiencies 
defenses.  Many gargantuan corporate mergers raise few antitrust 
concerns because the merging firms have few or no competitive 
overlaps or because they occur in relatively unconcentrated markets.  
Such mergers contribute far more to an increasing consolidation of 
economic power in the economy as a whole than do many mergers of 
small companies that attract antitrust attention because they occur in 
concentrated markets. 
  The top 1,000 firms accounted for a smaller share 
of GDP than fifty years earlier.   
The second argument, that aggregations of market power in 
culturally or politically sensitive industries may be undesirable even 
if those aggregations result in efficiencies, is also not a general 
justification for an asymmetrical approach to merger costs and 
benefits.  Assuming that political or social considerations sometimes 
count in favor of blocking a merger, such values should not be 
concealed in an implicit hostility to efficiencies.  Instead, they should 
be affirmatively expressed and weighed against other values in the 
context of merger review in limited set of cases to which they apply. 
Suppose, for example, that a large media merger increases 
concentration to levels that raise competitive concerns or achieves 
vertical integration that could potentially be used to block 
competitors from access to essential inputs.  Suppose that the merger 
would also generate large efficiencies that would be passed on to 
consumers.  Further suppose that there is a legitimate concern that 
concentrating too much power over news or entertainment in single 
managerial hands would lead to cultural or political hegemony—
concerns that were raised with respect to AOL’s merger with Time 
 
170 Lawrence J. White, What’s Been Happening to Aggregate Concentration in the 
United States (And Should We Care?), 
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/eco/wkpapers/workingpapers02/02-03White.pdf. 
171 Id. 
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Warner172 and Comcast’s acquisition of NBC.173
To be sure, different values—such as consumer welfare and 
avoidance of cultural hegemony—are often difficult to compare 
because they are incommensurate.  But that is all the more reason to 
raise and explore each value separately, as opposed to burying one 
value in an implicit reluctance to recognize another. 
  Step one in the 
analysis should require weighing the anticompetitive risks to 
consumers against the efficiencies, using an equal probability burden.  
At a second stage in the analysis, the separate political or social 
concerns should be raised and addressed in a transparent and open 
way. 
IV. RE-VALUING MERGER EFFICIENCIES 
The preceding section questioned the possible justifications for 
asymmetrical treatment of merger costs and efficiencies.  Since none 
of those justifications is sufficient to justify asymmetrical treatment, 
ordinary principles of cost-benefit analysis should apply to merger 
review.  In particular, the predicted costs of mergers from the post-
merger exercise of market power presumptively should be equally 
weighted with the predicted efficiencies of mergers with an equal 
present value.174
In order to operationalize a symmetrical approach, attention 
needs to be paid to three implementation issues.  The first concerns 
the relationship between the standard of proof and the burden of 
proof. The second concerns questions of commensurability and 
 
 
172 Frank Rich, Two 21st Century Foxes Elope, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 2000, at A17 
(“If you believe that the Internet is the greatest explosion of free expression and 
cultural resources of the past century, what happens when it is merchandised as a 
mass-market product by the biggest corporations in history?”). 
173 Gautham Nagesh, Lawmakers Divided Over Whether NBC-Comcast Merger 
Would Aid Diversity, http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/126051-
nbc-comcast-merger-divides-lawmakers-on-diversity-. 
174 The present value qualifier is necessary to highlight the fact that some 
efficiencies may not materialize for several years.  For example, if two merging 
firms plan to close their existing inefficient plans and open a single new and more 
efficient plant within three years following the merger (but only if they are able to 
merge—making the new plant a merger-specific efficiency), the future efficiencies 
resulting from the merger should be discounted to reflect the fact that the possible 
anticompetitive harms could begin immediately following consummation of the 
merger. 
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balancing.  The third concerns the increased costs that would arise 
from injecting greater complexity into merger review. 
 
A.  Standards of Proof and Burdens of Proof 
 
This paper calls for a symmetrical standard of proof for merger 
efficiencies and predicted anticompetitive effects.  That does not 
mean, however, that the government should be required to disprove 
possible efficiencies as part of its evaluation of the case. The 
weighting of costs and benefits is a separate question from the 
allocation of the burden of proof.  As a general matter, burdens of 
proof should be allocated to the party who can obtain the relevant 
information at the lower cost.175
If the government and merging parties are held to the same 
standard of proof—preponderance of the evidence, for example—
then, conceptually, harms and efficiencies will be given equal weight 
despite the different allocations of burdens of proof.  This does not 
mean, however, that the merging parties will find it as easy to prove 
efficiencies as the government will to prove harms.  It may be the 
case that certain classes of efficiencies are difficult to demonstrate 
even to fairly low thresholds of proof on a case-specific basis, even 
though there is a high degree of probability that they frequently 
appear in mergers.
  In a merger cases, the information 
validating efficiency claims is often uniquely in the possession of the 
merging parties, and it therefore makes sense that the merging parties 
should bear the burden of sustaining efficiencies claims.  Conversely, 
the government will ordinarily bear the burden of establishing 
predictive anticompetitive effects.   
176
If probabilities of harm are easier to demonstrate on an 
individualized basis than probabilities of efficiencies, even though in 
the aggregate both harms and efficiencies are similarly likely in the 
relevant categories of cases, then merger policy will display a bias in 
favor of theories of harm even if it adopts an explicit symmetry 
principle.  If so, then some systematic adjustment toward leniency, of 
the type advocated by Fisher and Lande, might still be justified.
 
177
 
175 CHRISTOPHER MUELLER & LAIRD KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE (2003). 
  
However, the first-order preference should be to treat harms and 
benefits symmetrically on an individualized basis and only make a 
176 See Fisher & Lande, supra n. xxx. 
177 See supra text accompany notes xxx – xxx. 
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systematic correction to the extent necessary in light of the system’s 
actual experience with a principle of symmetry.   
 
B.  Balancing and Problems of Commensurability 
 
Many commentators assert—along with the Merger Guidelines—
that the interplay between predictions of harm and predictions of 
efficiencies cannot come down to “balancing.”178  The influential 
Areda-Hovenkamp treatise argues: “’Balancing’ implies an ability to 
assign a common unit of measurement to the two things being 
balanced, and determine which outweighs the other.  Except in the 
clearest cases, this is simply not what courts are capable of doing.” 179
Indeed, it is often difficult to assign specific weights to 
anticompetitive effects and offsetting efficiencies given (a) 
uncertainty in the robustness of methodological tools, (b) data 
limitations with respect to future events, and (c) the likely timing in 
which anticompetitive effects or efficiencies may take effect and 
their subsequent duration.  Small predictive differences generated by 
imprecise methodological tools and imperfect data make large 
differences in assigning probability-adjusted values.  In most cases, it 
will be impossible to apply the suggested formula—assign equal 
weight to probability-adjusted net present values—mathematically 
and therefore to engage in anything approaching rigorous 
balancing.
  
180
But the failure of commensurability is not a reason to abandon 
symmetrical treatment as an analytical principle. Rather, it is a reason 
to use the principle of symmetrical treatment as a policy mnemonic 
device, much as we already use mathematically indeterminate 
concepts like probable cause and reasonable suspicion to capture 
probability values around identified legal decisions.  At present, the 
  The “40% probability of a $100 loss or gain” 
hypothetical presented in the introduction is just that—a hypothetical. 
 
178 IV AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra n. xxx ¶976c, at 103-04; Conrath & Widnell, 
supra n. xxx at 686 (arguing that “[t]he difficult challenge presented by such an 
efficiencies defense is whether there is a coherent way to balance the potential 
anticompetitive effects against its potential efficiency benefits”); Reckens, supra n. 
xxx at 179 (arguing that balancing of efficiencies and theories of harm can only 
take place under a total welfare effects framework). 
179 See IV AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra n. xxx ¶976c, at 103-04. 
180 But see Coate, supra n. xxx at 206-07 (arguing that econometric tools have 
sufficiently developed to permit calculations of net effects of efficiencies and 
increases in market power to be computed in some cases). 
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U.S. merger guidelines contain a mnemonic device of asymmetry— 
“the Agencies will not simply compare the magnitude of the cognizable 
efficiencies with the magnitude of the likely harm to competition absent the 
efficiencies.”181
Changing verbal formulations in merger guidelines or case law is, of 
course, not enough to effectuate meaningful change in agency or judicial 
practice.  The real point is that agencies and courts should be asked to think 
about merger efficiencies (at least those likely to be passed on to 
consumers) and predicted harms as concepts with equal prima facie dignity.  
By various institutional, legal, political, and administrative mechanisms, 
merger efficiencies have been deflated.  They deserve a more hospitable 
welcome. 
  They do not pretend that merger review involves precise 
computations of the probabilities of harms and benefits and a specified 
discount—say 20%–on the probability adjusted net present value of 
expected efficiencies before efficiencies are balanced against harms.  If the 
mnemonic device of asymmetry is insupportable, as argued in this paper, 
then the proper response is to implement a mnemonic device of symmetry. 
 
C. Costs of Increased Complexity 
 
The final consideration concerns the enhanced costs of revaluing 
merger efficiencies.  Commentators, particularly Fisher and Lande, 
have argued against individualized efficiencies defenses on the 
grounds that they increase both transaction costs—to parties, 
agencies, and courts—and uncertainty costs, since predicting whether 
a court or agency will accept an efficiencies argument is difficult.182
To be sure, an explicit or implicit revaluation of merger 
efficiencies will induce parties to spend more time presenting 
efficiencies arguments and require courts and agencies to spend more 
time considering them.  That in itself is not a sufficient objection 
unless the marginal social benefit of a more fine-tuned merger review 
system is less than the marginal cost of processing more information.  
Two observations suggest that the costs of individualized efficiencies 
review are not great given the status quo. 
 
First, Fisher and Lande presented a choice between no 
individualized consideration of efficiencies and symmetrical 
 
181 HMG § 10. 
182 Fisher &Lande, supra n. xxx at 1677. 
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treatment of efficiencies and harms.183  In fact, both the U.S. and the 
EU currently allow parties to make efficiencies arguments.  As noted 
earlier, the FTC study shows that parties usually do and that the staff 
responds to them.184
Second, it is doubtful that a greater receptivity to efficiencies 
claims would substantially increase the unpredictability of merger 
decisions in the agencies.  Fisher and Lande expressed their concern 
over unpredictability costs at a time when merger review was far 
more predictable than it is today.  Structural presumptions, such as 
four firm ratio tests and the HHI, still dominated merger analysis.
  Neither the agencies nor the parties spend as 
much time on efficiencies arguments as they would if a symmetry 
principle were adopted so there would be some marginal cost to 
putting a greater weight on efficiencies. But the marginal cost need 
not be large, given that much of the information is already collected 
and disseminated. 
185  
Over the last three decades, antitrust analysis has progressively de-
emphasized structural factors, moved toward more sophisticated 
econometric tools, and increasingly emphasized anticompetitive 
effects in differentiated goods and services markets.186  As the 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines explain, the “Guidelines should be 
read with the awareness that merger analysis does not consist of 
uniform application of a single methodology. Rather, it is a fact-
specific process through which the Agencies, guided by their 
extensive experience, apply a range of analytical tools to the 
reasonably available and reliable evidence to evaluate competitive 
concerns in a limited period of time.”187
The fact that merger analysis has become less predictable is not a 
reason to pile on additional and unnecessary unpredictability.  But 
  The analysis has become far 
more nuanced and technical—and therefore less predictable.  
Lawyers can no longer offer their clients clean predictions in many 
potentially close cases. 
 
183 Id. 
184 Supra n. xxx. 
185 Deborah A. Garza, Market Definition, the New Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
and the Long March Away from Structural Presumptions, 10-OCT-Antitrust 
Source 1, 2 (2010) (explaining importance of structural presumptions in 1968 and 
1982 Horizontal Merger Guidelines). 
186 See supra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx. 
187 HMG § 1. 
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given that merger review teams—both at the parties and at the 
agencies—already require the involvement of economists and 
industry experts in close cases and that these teams already consider 
efficiencies to some extent, relatively little marginal cost or 
unpredictability would be added by directing these teams to take 
efficiencies more seriously. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Merger policy has long been dominated by a focus on only one 
side of the ledger—anticompetitive effects. The reasons offered for 
ignoring the other side of the ledger are weak and often 
contradictory.  A principle of symmetrical treatment of predicted 
harms and efficiencies would improve merger policy, without 
necessarily liberalizing it in undesirable ways. 
For cultural and institutional reasons, the U.S. and EU are 
relatively unlikely explicitly to recognize a symmetry principle in the 
near future.  Both jurisdictions have already had to overcome a view 
that efficiencies should count against mergers.  Even conceding that 
efficiencies should play some small role in merger analysis was a big 
step.  The U.S. and EU are unlikely to take the final step to a 
symmetry principle any time soon—particularly given the 
maintenance of principles of symmetry in recent merger guidelines 
revisions. 
But the evolution of norms on the ground often precedes the 
evolution of norms on the books.  Particularly as the agencies move 
away from structural presumptions and focus their attention on 
unilateral anticompetitive effects theories in differentiated markets, 
there is an opportunity for greater attention to efficiencies that may 
offset competitive concerns. 
And then there is the rest of the world.  At present, at least 86 
jurisdictions have premerger notification regimes, many of them 
instituted in the last few years.188
 
188 Fox & Crane, supra n. xxx at 302. 
  In many developing countries, 
economic growth (as opposed to short-run consumer welfare) ranks 
high among the priorities for the antitrust regime.  Merger-generated 
efficiencies may receive a more cordial reception in jurisdictions 
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eager to stimulate industrial development.  The symmetry principle 
may first take root outside the traditional antitrust regimes. 
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